

the christian SCHOLAR



Charles W. Forman / *Preaching and Practice in Christianity and in Communism*. Robert Fossum / *The Defective Christ of Arthur Koestler*. Wm. T. Levy / *The Idea of the Church in T. S. Eliot*. Symposium: *The Nature of Theological Discourse*.

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The Christian Scholar

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR is a journal devoted to the exploration of Christian Faith and thought in relation to the whole range of the intellectual life and to the total task of higher education in our time.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR is closely associated with the *Faculty Christian Fellowship*, a community of persons in academic life whose concern is to relate the insights which arise from their Christian Faith to their teaching and their subject matter fields. The FCF can further be described as a conversation among all members of university life who take their work seriously, whether or not within the Church, to encourage re-examination of the Christian Faith in relation to the competing world-views.

Both *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR* and the *Faculty Christian Fellowship* are departments of the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches. The purpose of the Commission is to develop basic philosophy and requisite programs within its assigned field, to awaken the entire public to the conviction that religion is essential to a complete education and that education is necessary in the achievement of progress, to foster a vital Christian life in college and university communities of the U. S. A., to strengthen the Christian college, to promote religious instruction therein, and to emphasize the permanent necessity of higher education under distinctly Christian auspices.

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The Editor's Preface

To review higher educational issues at year's end can hardly be encompassed within these few pages. Moreover the discussion of current issues has not, strictly, been the objective of this preface, though it is an objective of our contents. But for our present purpose it may be well to consider three items which seem to have emerged rather repeatedly during the past twelve months.

I

One of these is the debate and inquiry which has centered upon the nature of the present student generation and the effectiveness of higher education in changing students' attitudes and values. Much of this was stimulated by the publication about a year ago of Professor Philip C. Jacob's study, *Changing Values in College*. A number of other writings have been related to the same general subject, and the most recently published of these is Professor W. Max Wise's report for the American Council on Education entitled, *They Come for the Best of Reasons*; still more writings are scheduled for publication and release soon. In the Wise report the point is made that we cannot generalize the nature of the present college or university student from what appeared to be true even a few years ago. Greater seriousness is evident in the more mature, harder-working student today than was true of "Joe College" some time ago. However a number of signs continue to provide some justification for the concern Jacob so ably expressed in his recent writing.

The issue which was brought to a focus by Jacob is not the condition of the contemporary student as such but the relative effect of higher learning in the formation or alteration of attitudes, values, and perspectives. Jacob's formulation of conclusions based upon an examination of a large body of research created a well-merited uproar among many categories of people concerned with higher education. In substance the summary of his conclusions is this:

When all is said and done, the value changes which seem to occur in college and set the college alumnus apart from others are not very great, at least for most students at most institutions. They certainly do not support the widely held assumption that a college education has an important, almost certainly "liberalizing," effect.

This was the main center of Jacob's study: whether higher education "makes a difference" or not.

The assertion that "basic values" remain largely constant — that students leave with about the same values with which they come — is in itself disturbing. But equally or more distressing is the conclusion that the addition of knowledge and the supposed development of critical capacities does not necessarily lift the value patterns or influence value situations. Nevertheless the reply could be made that what are singled out as "values" are not genuine or normative values but "preferences," not judgments which are set out as the right goals for everyone but choices "made" in hypothetical situations. Indeed some uncertainty remains around the question of what value is — whether

it is *what* is chosen, the fact *that* something is preferred, or *why* something is chosen. As long as several meanings seem to be indicated, the question of changing values in college is itself left up in the air.

This is particularly true when implicitly the tendency in modern thought to select the emphasis upon *preference* becomes determinative: a tendency, we might say, which is selected in part because it lends itself best to an empirical approach which can record choices numerically and which need not involve a normative aspect of values. But if this is the case, then it may be that the study of values in the social sciences for example is a way of reinforcing scepticism as regards the reality and power of values. If preferences can be explained by the conditions of the social group, then we may rightly be cynical about values and suppose that they represent only a basis for group conformity. If they are fixed, then education — the increase of knowledge and the formation of critical judgment — can not be expected to have effects.

This is the case unless one gives his attention to what Jacob calls "dominant values," that is, those which are more basic and important than others, those which we might say reveal the true person. These core values represent the orientation of the whole self, providing a person's unity, centeredness of purpose, or *where* he is in his decisions. While anyone aware of universities and colleges as they are will probably not be too messianic in his expectations of the effects of higher education, he will somehow still in all likelihood reflect

the view that the liberal studies should have something to do with a person's character, with this orientation of the self as a whole. He may perhaps doubt that virtue (to use Plato's term for values) can be taught like history or mathematics, but he is not likely to be content, if he is a sensitive educator, with educational aims and purposes which exclude interest in the realm of attitudes, values, or personal reality. An estimate of man which sees him as capable in freedom of becoming a person seems somehow to be prerequisite for the enterprise of higher learning, however little the institution may be able to supply beyond setting and limited resources.

It seems clear that, if this is the case, then some explicit attention has to be given to the sources and roots of values, to moral and religious dimensions in which there are normative criteria and which illuminate the whole height and depth of human existence. This may mean, for one thing, that we cannot talk about the desirability of higher learning's potentiality to affect values unless professors are willing to profess something in the way of their own convictions. Responsibility is inescapable for an institution devoted to higher learning. Its calling is that of being a community of persons engaged in a search for that style of life which is best for man and for its intelligible grounds as well as its most penetrating dimensions. To draw more carefully and clearly the distinctions between the ideal and the actual is important, to resolve to seek renewal and health, and to acknowledge the scope of responsibility is more important.

THE EDITOR'S PREFACE

II

A second area of discussion has brought into focus some of the current issues in the relation of religion and the state university. In large part this has been due to the stream of publications which has appeared in connection with the centennial observance of student religious work at the University of Michigan. The historical background has been described in several books, and a collection of essays on various aspects of the position of religion in the state university has appeared more recently. We would call attention particularly to this latter volume, edited by Erich A. Walter and entitled *Religion and the State University*. It presents a wide diversity of view-points on the pluralistic setting of the state university, the relation of religion to university in general and to the curriculum, and various campus problems which bear upon religion's role in the contemporary situation.

It must be noted however that the discussions which have centered on this subject have emerged out of a wider context as well. Increasingly larger numbers and percentages of students are attending public universities and colleges; hence the problems are at least quantitatively heightened in importance. But in addition, as Mr. Will Herberg pointed out in a Seminar of the Fund for the Republic on Religion and Freedom, we should note that before one can handle any issues in the relation of religion and American higher education, it is essential that one understands how the concept of public education is used. The "public" character of higher educa-

tion is true of most colleges and universities. They all have a task in educating citizens for a pluralistic society which demands diversity and tolerance as opposed to the inculcation of a common doctrine and the creation of a uniform mentality. Thus what is demanded in the "public" situation is often in principle essential also for many private and Church-related institutions though they may modify the demands considerably in the light of their constituencies, size, and particular educational objectives.

It appears, in any event, that discussions of this issue have begun to reveal certain new emphases. Exclusive preoccupation with limitations implied in the "doctrine" of the separation of church and state and the often-assumed implicate of the separation of religion and "secular" education have tended to be off-set by careful reflection upon the nature of this legal basis and of public opinion, as is indicated in the volume referred to in an essay by Professor Paul G. Kauper. It is also countered by the recognition that religion has a place within the curriculum both as a branch of learning and as a related dimension of the major curricular divisions.

A judicious and balanced view of the university as a "public" order in society moreover suggests that it can be rather sharply differentiated from the secondary level. Hence a higher educational institution is likely to do what colleges and universities, in the mainstream of their whole Western tradition, have been inclined to do — to encompass, insofar as possible, the whole scope of knowledge and human experi-

ence. Since students are not required by law to attend them, and since they employ generally a practice of elective studies, public universities are somewhat freer to include religion in their program than public institutions at the lower levels. Professor William K. Frankena analyzes some of the philosophical issues involved in the treatment of religion and ultimate views in the university. His words of caution are as important as his view of the role religion has in the academic scene in America. As Professor Frankena notes, the "secular" status of the university, however ambiguous the term may be, does not dismiss the need to consider religion, but its task on the academic side is to "inform" and "discipline" its students "in order to provide them with a liberal or a professional education." This means that "objective and scholarly" presentation of religion is called for.

Here we touch upon an issue already raised in the previous section. To what degree may a university seek to lead its members to particular ultimate commitments, that is, to commitments which affect the persons' orientations to life, their unity, their basic decisions? Apparently we would say that exposure of persons to the alternatives and the issues involved in such commitments cannot be ignored if we would deal with knowledge in its depth and height and if wisdom is the desired end of higher learning. But the crucial question is already posed by the insistence that such exposure must be true to "objective and scholarly" criteria. The aim must not be to get religion into the scope of studies but to achieve the academic integrity of the college and university. The problem

is to find the right men, the scholars, thinkers, teachers, counselors, who together sense the proper relation of commitments to academic practice, who can deal both objectively and sympathetically with the issues of truth. The question of values and religion drives us back to the root responsibility which colleges and universities have and must acknowledge: to engage persons in the search for that form of life which is genuinely best for man and for its intelligible grounds as well as its most penetrating dimensions.

III

As the title of this journal indicates, a particular emphasis is given to those who as persons bear such a responsibility. Primary stress is placed not on programs or syntheses but on persons who, within communities of faith and learning seek to understand this larger responsibility within the context of their vocations as Christians and scholars. These are the persons involved in the dialogue of faith and learning. Recent years have shown signs of the greater awakening of this search and the development of capacities for carrying on the dialogue, as scholars of distinction in their own fields have expressed an interest in understanding their vocations as Christians.

There is however a feeling that greater questioning has begun to enter the scene. In more "emancipated" countries, such as those in Europe, where the condition of secularity is more advanced than in America, the sense of *caution* among scholars who are also Christians is keen. When shallow writings appear,

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as they sometimes unfortunately do, seeking to relate Christian faith and academic scholarship, or when claims are made which seem to imperil the integrity of either or both rigorous scholarship and the Christian faith, reasons for a sense of caution and hesitancy about relating Christian faith and the academic disciplines becomes apparent.

But what may be more obvious is the ground for such timidity. We are passing from interest at the general level to more individual questions which demand limited topics and closer reflection or analysis. We are having to carry on the dialogue in a cultural context which reveals more sharply than before the need for discernment with respect to values and academic practice. Perhaps too, a greater amount of theological clarity suggests how complicated are any of the concerns which seek to relate intimately the different orders of grace and of nature. The distinctness of these orders — of "faith" and of "learning" — must be affirmed where the blurring of them is dangerous for both. What is needed is a full acceptance of the proper secularity of an academic discipline, that is, the discipline properly addressing itself to the issues of man and the world which belong to the order of nature, as well as the proper secularity of a scholar in his discipline, whether he is or is not a Christian.

Were then the original questions of the concern of this journal phrased by overly-articulate Christian imaginations, motivated by either fear or zeal? Were there only believed to be "frontier issues" when in fact there was no frontier? The answers to these questions can be negatively put. The task to which we

have addressed much of our attention is that of clarifying what was perilously blurred. We have sought to pose the issues of what difference a Christian point-of-view makes to academic affairs and to scholarly questions. We have tried to give room for the expression of a wide range of perspectives centered upon the need for greater self-consciousness of what was involved in any enterprise devoted to higher learning. In the midst of a benign, religiously-conditioned culture we have insisted upon some essential distinctions between proper and improper relations of Christianity and scholarship, and we have sought to explore some of the confusion which results when issues in the relation of faith and learning are blurred.

Behind all of this, the concern of this journal is in the way of approach to many kinds of questions of academic importance — that the approach should be that of honesty, integrity, a proper upholding of standards of excellence, and a sense of forbearance among students and teachers. If the work of the scholar and teacher is done for the glory of God, the hope may also be held that it will possess both the meaning and the excellence which is the end of scholarly work. This journal has tried to point out that the Christian's vocational life, to use Professor Carl Michalson's phrasing, "is the arena in which God's calling is to be worked out."

Thus observable ethical conduct is not the sole and exhaustive expression of the Christian's responsibility within his profession. Nor is his faith only a distant backdrop far removed from the public roles of teaching, research, and

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writing. The responsibility which rests upon the academic community is sensitively felt by the Christian in scholarship. He knows that the calling of God comes with regard to his views of man, history, and nature; and he knows that it comes with the reminder that Christ too was a teacher. It comes with the disturbing awareness that to be a determinist in one's social science is dif-

ficult if we profess to follow a Lord who insisted that we live not by bread alone. It comes as a challenge to our assumption that knowing more and more of the truth in the sciences will make for an eventual liberation of mankind; the promise which is given us is, rather, this: "If you continue in my word . . . , you will know the truth and the truth will make you free."

Please note our new Christmas subscription offer. Many subscribers and friends of *The Christian Scholar* make small annual contributions to our budget in the knowledge that we always must rely upon a large subsidy in order to publish a journal like this. That is a real help and much appreciated. But we feel that the best way for you to help us is to give us new subscribers. If you often mention *The Christian Scholar* to your colleagues, you might also give them a look at it. For the

first time we are offering a special gift subscription rate: \$4.00 for the first and \$3.00 for each additional new subscription. A subscriber may also include his own renewal for only \$3.00 in taking advantage of this offer. This is an obvious saving to you, but it is also a good way to promote something which you already think is significant and to include more of your colleagues in our common endeavor to relate faith and learning responsibly in our daily academic work. A postpaid order form is enclosed for your convenience.

Subscribers to *The Christian Scholar* should note that a special issue (Autumn 1958) of this journal has been published which they will not receive as a part of their subscriptions; however each subscriber may purchase a single copy at the reduced rate of \$1.00. On the theme, "The Vocation of the Christian College," the special issue contains the addresses and reports from

the second quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges, Drake University, June 22-26, 1958. See the back cover of this present issue for its contents. We enclose a postpaid card for convenience in placing your order. We hope that subscribers will place their orders before the very limited supply is exhausted by other interested people, as is now readily happening.

The Defective Christ of Arthur Koestler

ROBERT H. FOSSUM

I

Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* is generally regarded as one of the finest of the many contemporary novels attacking totalitarianism. It is a powerful fictional account of the Moscow trials of the 1930's and a perceptive analysis of the psycho-philosophical bases of the "confessions." Although Koestler is aware of the physical tortures employed by the Stalinists, his novel attempts to show that men such as Bukharin were driven to confess, not so much by physical pressure, but by the consequences of their own logic.

Because the book is about Communism however the tendency has been to treat it as a political essay, forgetting that it is after all a novel. To fully understand it then, we have to be aware of the author's esthetic method. Koestler makes effective use of several fictional devices, but the strategy utilized most consistently is ironic parallelism. Rubashov is portrayed as a sincere but misguided Christ, a founder of a new religion, and a would-be savior who is crucified by his own people; Rubashov's Three Hearings are ironically parallel to the three temptations of Christ; the Communist Party is compared to the Catholic Church, the purges to the Inquisition, No. 1 to a high priest of the Church. Not content with such a relatively simple framework, Koestler increases the allusive complexity of the book by a further parallel — to Dostoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor" chapter of *The Brothers Karamazov*. Rubashov's situation is the same as that of Christ in Ivan Karamazov's "poem": both are prisoners of the regime; both have outlived their usefulness and are unwanted; both are ultimately put out of the way by the very institutions they created. Rubashov's inquisitor, Gletkin, takes the same attitude toward his prisoner that Dostoevsky's priest takes toward Christ. Even their inquisitorial arguments are similar.

By juxtaposing suggestions of the crucifixion, the historical inquisition, and the fictional inquisition of Dostoevsky's novel, Koestler not only creates an elaborate and interwoven series of ironic parallels to the events and characters of his novel; he also telescopes the history of totalitarianism and its martyrs, both religious and secular, into one ironic image.

II

That Rubashov is a Christ-figure is almost immediately apparent. Although Koestler's title refers to the blindness or evil of the Party midway in its history and to Rubashov's dark night of the soul at the turning point in his thinking, it also

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suggests the time of Christ's crucifixion, when a "great darkness fell upon the earth." Rubashov's captors wear barbed crosses as insignia and are called Praetorian guards. Rubashov himself, observing a hole in his sock, thinks of a verse which "compared the feet of Christ to a white roebuck in a thorn bush." Later on, the identification of Rubashov with Christ becomes clearer. The old revolutionist recalls the picture of the first Party congress in which all the members "wore beards and small numbered circles like haloes round their heads." The suggestion of the Last Supper is unmistakable. He recalls also his return from exile, when there were "receptions and jubilant mass meetings" and he was "conducted in triumph through the meetings," suggesting Christ's triumphal journey through Jerusalem. As head of the Trade Delegation, Rubashov has twelve subordinates, and he speaks to them in Christ-like parables, in the "simple terms one would use to a savage or a child." In his cell Rubashov wears a blanket about his shoulders, suggesting the hooded figure of Christ, and he is described as looking like a monk at prayer. The most conclusive identification comes near the end of the book. Old Wassilij, Rubashov's porter and one of his companions in the Revolution, has been forced to burn his Bible; now, after the trial, he is compelled to remove Rubashov's portrait which has hung like a crucifix on a rusty nail over his bed. As his daughter reads the account of Rubashov's trial, Wassilij recalls the crucifixion. When he signs the petition condemning his old comrade, he thinks of himself as Peter who thrice denied Christ. Having signed, he turns to the wall, stares at the rusty nail, and murmurs, "Thy will be done." Rubashov has been crucified by those he tried to serve.

Although Koestler expresses sympathy and admiration for his protagonist by identifying Rubashov with Christ, the book is clearly not a simple eulogy of the Old Guard, because it is a highly defective Christ that stands trial here. Rubashov is as much betrayer as betrayed, as much Judas as Christ. In this case it is Christ who denies his disciples: Richard, Little Loewy, Arlova. It is Arlova who sacrifices herself; and Little Loewy, betrayer of none, who hangs himself. It is Rubashov, not the stuttering Richard, who is the betrayer and the real "defective."¹

Rubashov is guilty in more ways than one however: he is guilty, according to his "bourgeois conscience," of betraying his disciples; guilty according to the Communist "morality" he professes, of betraying the Party; and lastly, guilty of deviating from his own "Consequent logic." He has transgressed against all three codes and he must pay. He asks, "Must one also pay for righteous acts? . . . Did the righteous man perhaps carry the heaviest debt when weighed by the other measure? Was his debt, perhaps, counted double — for the others knew not what they did?"

Just as Rubashov is both Christ and Judas, depending on the "measure" used and the acts being weighed, so is he tempted by two kinds of devils. As mentioned

¹ Noticing Richard's stammer, Rubashov muses on the "surprising number of defectives in the Party." Later on overwhelmed by memories of those he betrayed, he questions his own soundness: "When and where in history had there ever been such defective saints?" The tragic flaw in Rubashov is symbolized by his "defective eye-tooth."

earlier, Rubashov's Three Hearings parallel the three temptations of Christ. But the identity of the devil in *Darkness at Noon* is as uncertain as Rubashov's moral measure. Rubashov's "bourgeois conscience" tells him that Ivanov is the tempter, as Ivanov himself suggests. Yet Ivanov also points out that it is that very conscience which, in Communist terms, is to be avoided. The values have changed: Christ must be Judas if he is to be a savior; God is the force of evil; and Satan, the voice of reason, must be worshipped. Ivanov says,

Satan . . . is thin, ascetic and a fanatical devotee of logic. He reads Machiavelli, Ignatius of Loyola, Marx and Hegel; he is cold and unmerciful to mankind, out of a kind of mathematical mercifulness. He is damned always to do that which is most repugnant to him: to become a slaughterer, in order to abolish slaughtering, to sacrifice lambs so that no more lambs may be slaughtered, to whip people with knouts so that they may learn not to let themselves be whipped, to strip himself of every scruple in the name of a higher scrupulousness, and to challenge the hatred of mankind because of his love for it. . . .

In the Communist miracle play God wears the "double-chin of industrial liberalism" and dangles his temptations before the revolutionary; as long as chaos dominates the world, every compromise with this deceitful God is a betrayal of man. Only Satanic logic can save the world. Ivanov even defends Judas: "To sell oneself for thirty pieces of silver is an honest transaction; but to sell oneself to one's own conscience is to abandon mankind." Ivanov admits that he speaks for Satan and that he is Rubashov's tempter. But he also insists that Satan is right and that Rubashov should submit. Even the nature of the temptations are Satanic: Rubashov is offered power and authority, so that he may work for the world of the future.

Ivanov and consequent logic win out; Rubashov prepares to confess. But when Gletkin takes over the interrogation, Rubashov discovers that he has sinned more than he thought. Thinking himself a Christ, he has been in all ways a Judas: he has betrayed his comrades in the name of utilitarian morality; betrayed that morality by expressing doubt of No. 1; but more than that, he has betrayed consequent logic by failing to carry out the crimes of which he is accused. Made aware of his sins by Gletkin, he goes to his death.

Ironically, it is his reason rather than his "bourgeois scruples" which convinces him that he has helped to found a defective religion. It is *objectively* wrong to throw "ethical ballast" overboard; *illogical* to believe that ends are not affected by means; *illogical* to believe that "economic fatality" is the only factor in the social equation; and finally, *illogical* to deny the existence and power of the "grammatical fiction" and the "oceanic sense." Rubashov is a defective Christ, Party logic is not infallible, and Satan is not the voice of reason — he only seems to be.

Rubashov dies with many questions unanswered. Is he dying, as did Christ, for humanity? Is he dying for the Party which will find the promised land or is he dying for a perverted version of it?² What has he served and what has he betrayed? Even at the moment of death, Rubashov doesn't know if he is Christ or Judas.

III

The ironic parallels between Communism and Christianity are extended by Koestler's comparison of the Party to the Church. Communist theory is made analogous to Church dogma; No. 1 is compared to a "high priest celebrating the mass" and his speeches to an "infallible catechism";³ No. 1's picture hangs, like a religious image, over his subjects' beds. And at this point in history, Koestler makes clear, the Party is conducting an inquisition of heretics.

But it is not only an authoritarian Church and the historical Inquisition that *Darkness at Noon* parallels; it more particularly suggests the "Grand Inquisition" of Ivan Karamazov's imagination. Gletkin's interrogation of Rubashov is a twentieth century Grand Inquisition with Rubashov as the rejected Christ, the Party as the Church, and Gletkin as the Inquisitor. Just as Koestler telescopes history by uniting suggestions of the crucifixion and the Inquisition, so here he condenses into one image his own and Dostoevsky's fictional accounts of a rejected Christ.⁴ Even the incidental aspects of the two episodes are comparable: Christ and Rubashov are prisoners; Gletkin and the Inquisitor make use of lights; Gletkin and the Inquisitor (and the Satan of Ivanov's description, too) are ascetics and have spent time "in the desert"; both have assumed responsibility for the masses of believers; and, both Christ and Rubashov are banished to the dark alleyways of history. More importantly, just as Christ was the first link in the chain that culminated in the Inquisition, so has Rubashov forged Gletkin and No. 1. Neither Christ nor Rubashov is needed or wanted any longer. There is only one last service they can do for their cause: "fade away into darkness."

Gletkin's arguments are remarkably parallel to those of the Grand Inquisitor. Christ is blamed by the Inquisitor for rejecting the temptations of Satan, thereby denying humanity what it wants: bread, miracle, mystery, and authority. Gletkin provokes Rubashov to say, "I plead guilty to having placed the idea of man above the idea of mankind." According to Gletkin, Rubashov tried to give men

² As he dies, Rubashov's fading eyesight cannot identify the insignia on his executioner's sleeve — is it the badge of Communism or Fascism?

³ No. 1's speeches and articles are even described as having the Thomistic question-and-answer form.

⁴ Bukharin's final speech to the Moscow court contains a reference to Dostoevsky. Also, during Ivanov's discussions with Rubashov, Ivanov derides *Crime and Punishment* because, he says, it distorts the problem of ends and means. It is unlikely that he or Gletkin would deride the Grand Inquisitor however.

freedom with methods which the Grand Inquisitor calls "in appearance so desirable, actually so deadly." Neither Gletkin nor the Inquisitor believes the masses want freedom. Gletkin points out that when the peasants were offered it, they thought it a joke and the Party members half-wits. Similarly, the Grand Inquisitor says to Christ,

Thou wouldst go into the world, and art going with empty hands, with some promise of freedom which men in their simplicity and their natural unruliness cannot even understand, which they fear and dread—for nothing has been more insupportable for a man and a human society than freedom.

The Grand Inquisitor accuses Christ of asking too much of man. The Old Guard's mistake, according to Gletkin, was expecting that the masses were immediately ready for the utopia. But fortunately, according to both inquisitors, the Rubashovs handed their work on to the Gletkins, the Christs to the high priests of the Church. It might be Gletkin rather than the Grand Inquisitor who says, "We have corrected Thy work and founded it upon *miracle, mystery, and authority.*" And Gletkin is as aware as the Grand Inquisitor of man's need for miracle. He says to Rubashov,

Whether Jesus spoke the truth or not, when he asserted he was the son of God and of the virgin is of no interest to any sensible person. It is said to be symbolical, but the peasants take it literally. We have the same right to invent useful symbols which the peasants take literally.

The mystery of the Church, says the Inquisitor, is that "We are not working with Thee, but with *him* [Satan] — that is our mystery." It is the mystery of the Party, too. It is Ivanov's devil, the wise spirit, the voice of reason, that governs the Party; but the Big Lie is necessary, because man cannot understand the truth. The Gletkins and the Inquisitors have taken from the Devil what Christ and the Rubashovs have rejected; they have accepted the temptation for the well-being of mankind. They have lured men, as the Inquisitor says, "with the reward of heaven and eternity," whether it be the traditional heaven or the Communist utopia of the future. But to reach the promised land, complete submission is necessary. Gletkin, along with the Inquisitor, believes that freedom and bread enough for all are impossible together. It might well be Gletkin rather than the Inquisitor who says of the people, "They are sinful and rebellious, but in the end they will become obedient. They will marvel at us and look on us as gods . . ."

If such are the conditions necessary for the "universal happiness of man," it is obvious that Christ and Rubashov must be put away. The Inquisitor tells Christ

that He must go, that His presence is now a danger: "Whatsoever Thou revealest anew will encroach on man's freedom of faith . . ." Gletkin tells Rubashov that the last service he can render the Party is to die — and to die excoriated and rejected by the very masses to whom Rubashov bends his knee and for whom Christ was crucified; the masses who will "heap the hot cinders about the pile." For as the Inquisitor says, "if anyone has ever deserved our fires it is Thee." It is Christ and the Rubashovs, with their concern for the freedom of individual men, who impede progress toward the promised land of collective happiness. As the Inquisitor says,

We took . . . Rome and the sword of Caesar, and proclaimed ourselves rulers of the earth, though hitherto we have not been able to complete our work. But whose fault is that? Oh, the work is only beginning, but it has begun. It has long to await completion and the earth has yet much to suffer, but we shall triumph and shall be Caesars, and then we shall plan the universal happiness of man. . .

In Ivan's poem Christ kisses the Inquisitor and leaves. Rubashov also "for-gives" the Party, hoping only that history will redeem him. But the "Grand Inquisitor" chapter may give us an ironic prophecy of the future: there will be no resurrection of the Rubashovs; their memories will be as thoroughly banished as is Christ by the Inquisitor.

As pointed out before however, Rubashov's similarity to Christ is ironic and qualified. He is Judas as well as Christ, betrayer as well as betrayed. So too is he Inquisitor. He has not only created Gletkin, he provides him with his logic, Gletkin consistently quotes Rubashov's diary. It is Rubashov who, in his diary, insists that lies, totalitarian power, and "miracle" ("threats and promises . . . imaginary terrors and imaginary consolations") are necessary if the ultimate good is to be achieved. It is Rubashov, not Gletkin, who lit the funeral pyres of Little Loewy and Arlova. It is Rubashov too who formulates the theory of the "relative political maturity of the masses" and the necessity for dictatorship. And it is Rubashov who points out that, like Dostoevsky's priest, the Old Guard of the Party "constantly felt . . . the whole weight of responsibility for the superindividual life to come." Rubashov then is not only the unwanted Christ, He is Judas, he is Ivanov's devil who sacrificed mankind in order to save it, and he is the Inquisitor. Rubashov's dualism is dramatized by his concept of the "grammatical fiction"; that "thoroughly tangible component" of his personality which he sometimes identifies as the tempter, sometimes as his real self. The dialogues carried on between the two parts of his personality may be viewed as dialogues between Christ and Satan, Christ and Judas, Christ and the Inquisitor — but he is unaware of which is which.

Herein lies Koestler's sympathy for Rubashov, the dualistic and defective Christ. Like the Inquisitor, he has sold his soul to the devil for the salvation

of mankind, assumed the terrible responsibility, and been left with only the "hope of history's absolution." Like Christ he has been "crucified in the name of his own faith"; but unlike Christ he "had not been taken to the top of a mountain; and wherever his eye looked he saw nothing but desert and the darkness of night."

Ivan Karamazov has the same kind of sympathy for his Inquisitor.

... but isn't that suffering, at least for a man like that, who has wasted his whole life in the desert and yet could not shake off his incurable love of humanity? In his old age he reached the conviction that nothing but the advice of the great dread spirit could build up any tolerable sort of life for the feeble, unruly 'incomplete, empirical creatures created in jest.' And so, convinced of this, he sees that he must follow the counsel of the wise spirit, the dread spirit of death and destruction and yet deceive them all the way so that they may not notice where they are being led, that the poor blind creatures may at least on the way think themselves happy.

In fact Rubashov is a partial reflection of Ivan Karamazov: a lover of mankind who thought everything was permitted: who created a Smerdyakov (Gletkin) lacking the conscience or intelligence of his creator; who was haunted by a devil within himself; who is destroyed by the irrefutable, inevitable consequences of his own logic; who confesses to crimes which he has not committed but which, logically, he should have committed; who rejects his God (in Rubashov's case, the Party logic) because he cannot accept the necessary sacrifice of innocents; who believed in the possibility of a man-god and perfect happiness in the world.

So it seems that further light is thrown on *Darkness at Noon* by recognizing Koestler's use of ironic parallelism. It is clear that he made fully conscious use of biblical parallels and, by telescoping history, intended to show the essential oneness of religious and secular totalitarianism. It is also apparent that the suggestions of both Christ and Judas in the portrayal of Rubashov are intended to show not only the paradoxical dualism of Rubashov's character but also Koestler's attitude toward him. Whether Koestler was aware of the striking parallels with *The Brothers Karamazov* is not so certain. In any case Koestler has perhaps demonstrated the truth of the Grand Inquisitor's statement that in the three temptations of Christ "the whole subsequent history of mankind is . . . brought together into one whole, and foretold, and in them are united all unsolved historical contradictions of human nature."

Preaching and Practice in Christianity And in Communism

CHARLES W. FORMAN

There is no accusation more frequently levelled against the Western world by Communists and also by Asians and Africans than the claim that the West fails to practice what it preaches. It preaches human equality but practices racial segregation. It preaches freedom but practices colonial domination. No accusation is more difficult to answer, for the contradictions in Western life are all too apparent. They penetrate down to the very foundations. Reinhold Niebuhr's familiar dictum that man's capacity for goodness makes democracy possible and man's capacity for evil makes democracy necessary indicates that Western democracy is founded to some extent upon the assumption that men will not practice the good which they preach.

The Christian religion comes in regularly for the same kind of criticism. Vera Micheles Dean reports that a "*New York Times* survey of the role of church missions in non-Western countries pointed out [that] Christians are now 'paying a price, not for their teaching, but for not consistently practicing what they preach.'"¹ Asians continuously dwell on this theme. The Home Minister of the Government of India on a recent occasion declared, "The essence of Christianity does not seem to be the principle of those who are today enjoying all the comforts and amenities that life can possibly be equipped with. Similarly, in other ways too, there is more of Christianity in India than in the so-called Christian countries." And, as in the case of Western life generally, this separation between practice and preaching seems to go back to the original roots of the faith. St. Paul's phrase, "I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate," is the classic expression of contradiction between preaching and practice. The Christian doctrine that all men are sinners suggests the same condition.

Against all this confessed contradiction in the heart of the West stands the world of Communism, displaying a brilliant and impressive unity between its theory and its practice. Unity in all matters is a watchword of the Communists. "The steel-like unity and the monolithic unity of the ranks of the Party," are forever extolled. Basic to all such expressions of unity is the unity between theory and action, between preaching and practice.

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¹*The Nature of the Non-Western World*. New York: Mentor Books, 1957, p. 258.

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The readiness of Communists to do whatever is demanded by their belief, to make any sacrifice that is called for by the preaching, is known throughout the world and is a chief source of Communist strength. Whittaker Chambers tells of one of his former Communist heroes, a German, who when sentenced to death retorted to the judge, "We Communists are always under sentence of death." Lenin declared that Communists were people ready to give their whole lives and not just their spare evenings for the truth in which they believed. Nor do Communists boast of just a one-way correlation of acts with theories. They similarly strive to make their theories fit their acts. Their meetings are often begun with long analyses of "the concrete situation." Their programs and actions are exhaustively discussed in training schools of theory. Even the Communist notoriety for duplicity and deceptive promises represents not so often a failure to practice what they preach as a failure on the part of others to understand what they really preach.

This unity between preaching and practice goes back to the original roots of Communism. According to its basic beliefs there must be no such contradiction within its life as exists in the heart of Western and Christian life. Karl Mannheim pointed to this as the characteristic feature of Communism when he described the Marxian as one who combined the conservative's assurance out of the past with the liberal's assurance in the future; or, in other words, the conservative's sense of the inherent power of institutions and the liberal's sense of the inherent power of ideas. There is in the Marxian view no contradiction between ideas and institutions. Preaching and practice fit together. The inspiring theories about the future and the binding actions of the past unite to strengthen and support each other. This has become the great source of strength in Communism. Mao Tse-tung, insisting on this unity, said, "Theory becomes aimless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice . . . practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory" (quoted by Chen Po-ta in *Seven Hundred Millions for Peace and Democracy*).

The reason why such perfect correspondence between preaching and practice is regarded as possible for the Communist takes us into the very heart of Marxian belief, even as the reason for the Christian expectation of contradiction in these matters takes us to the heart of Christian belief. For the Communist the correspondence can exist, indeed must exist, because of at least two facts. First, the Communist represents the propertyless people of the world. In the Marxian outlook private property is constantly linked with human evil. It is because men can produce more than they need and thus have a surplus which can become another man's property that the whole struggle of history begins. Men's inability to see the truth and do the right stems from their desire to protect their property. Marx said in effect, "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also." And if your treasure is in property rather than humanity, you will not let yourself see that

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which is for the good of humanity. The propertyless, having no such corrupting treasure, are able to see and do rightly.

The second reason for this clarity and probity on the part of the Communist is that he represents the unalienated people of the world. Alienation of men from themselves and from each other was a recurring theme in Marx's thought, approached in different ways at different times. Men are alienated, he said, from their own true selves, and so they have to construct an external God as a substitute for what should really be within them. Men are alienated from their own labor and from the products of their own labor so that man's own production comes to be an external inhuman power dominating mankind. Men are alienated from each other and from the expression of their own full selves by the division of labor which restricts them to one particular form of self-expression. Most significant, men are alienated from each other and from themselves by their divisions into classes. As long as men stand in a particular class, divided from and turned against other classes, they cannot view the world from the standpoint of humanity as a whole but only from the standpoint of their class. They cannot see the whole truth; they cannot be their full human selves. The external alienation from other parts of humanity becomes an internal alienation from their own full humanity.

But the proletariat, while participating to a certain extent in this alienation, hold the key which can release men from such misery. For the proletariat is the one class which does not exist by creating other classes. It does not have to grind down others in order to maintain itself as a class, and so it is the one class which can conceivably include all men. Therefore, while other classes inevitably want to cling to the conditions of alienation, the proletariat has no such desire. "The possessing class," wrote Marx, "and the class of the proletariat represent the same human self-estrangement. But the former is comfortable in this self-estrangement and finds therein its own confirmation. . . . The latter feels itself annihilated in this self-estrangement, sees in it its impotence and the reality of a non-human existence."² Therefore the proletariat alone can see the outlines of a truly human existence; it alone can speak for a truly human point of view; it alone is forced by the terrible conditions of its life to look at reality rather than pretense.

The representatives of the proletariat then are the only valid spokesmen for mankind. They alone can see the truth and do the right. In them alone preaching and practice can be identical. Alfred G. Meyer, who has emphasized the centrality of this assurance for the whole Communist movement, indicates some of its wide significance in these words:

In short, the doctrine of the unity of theory and practice obliterates all differences between science and ethics, and tries to unite both in an all-

²*The Holy Family*, quoted in Alistair MacIntyre, *Marxism, an Interpretation*, p. 60.

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embracing world outlook, in which ethics is derived scientifically, but social science is scientific only when it is ethical. The doctrine thus springs from the radical revolutionary's yearning to fight for progress with open eyes guided by scientific knowledge about the world, and for his striving for reassurance that the god of history looks upon his efforts with favor.³

Such is the vision. But in actual experience the proletariat has not always been such an epitome of truth and virtue, even of Marxian truth and virtue. This is the stone of stumbling for Communism. Lenin admitted that "the working class left to its own resources can rise no higher than trade union consciousness," and Stalin declared that "the Party cannot be a real Party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class think. . . The Party must take its stand at the head of the working class, it must see ahead of the working class and lead the proletariat and not trail behind it."⁴ This belies the Marxian view of proletarian destiny and certainly destroys the picture of a class which because of its position inevitably sees the truth of all men's needs and acts in terms of that truth. Even to Marx himself, as Meyer shows, the proletariat proved to be a disappointment. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx obviously expected the coming revolution to be one in which the proletariat would arise and shake off its chains. It would transform the bourgeois revolution into a proletarian-dominated revolt. But when the revolution of 1848 actually came, the proletariat showed no such strength or ability. Marx was reduced to working out a minimum program, such as that prepared eventually for the French Social Democratic party, in order to train the proletariat to be in practice what in theory it already was. Plainly there was a *division* between the theory of the proletariat and the practice of the proletariat. And if that were true of the proletariat, then it could be equally true of the leaders and representatives of the proletariat, namely the Communists.

Here is where corroding doubt begins to creep into the whole magnificent structure. What seemed so fine and sure turns out to be full of wishful thinking. The Communists scarcely dare abandon the structure for fear of losing their whole case and with it their whole cause. Consequently they have made one long, determined effort to shore up the structure. From the beginnings of the movement right down to the present time this effort can be seen to re-establish the identity of the "is" and the "ought."

Various observers have noted this breakdown and attempted reconstitution at various points in the Communist development. Meyer finds it in all the efforts of Marx after the disasters of 1848. He made one great *tour de force* after another, *Das Kapital* being the most impressive of them, to provide scientific props for the faith that had been undermined by the revolutionary storms and to insist still

³*Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice*, pp. 105-6.

⁴*Foundations of Leninism*, p. 106.

that practice must be the same as his theory. Alistair McIntyre finds evidence of this same problem for Marx in all his work following *National Economy and Philosophy*. In the earlier work, according to McIntyre's analysis, Marx had been content with the "prophetic" outlook, pointing to the evils in human life and declaring that they would lead to judgment, but the rest of his years were poured out in the attempt to show that what had legitimately been a matter of prophecy could somehow stand as a matter of scientific theory.

Martin Buber traces a similar breakdown in Marx's thought in terms of his treatment of the "Utopian socialists." The trouble with the Utopians according to Marx was precisely their separation between theory and practice. Saint Simon, Owen, and Fourier represented the "socialism out of the head" which characterized what Mannheim would call the whole liberal approach to society, the belief that the truth of an idea would assure its eventual triumph. Marx and Engels were pitiless in their scorn of all who thought that the self-evident virtues of socialism would make it come to pass. Socialism, as they saw it, would grow out of existing conditions, not out of abstract reasoning, and they believed their great merit was in discovering how that which theory showed to be desirable, social practice showed to be inevitable. But, as Buber says, this "discovery" of the unity of theory and action proved to be their undoing, for it led them to oppose all those who did not see social practice as supporting the same kind of theory as they had espoused. That is, all practice had to be proof of their particular theory, and where they had originally denounced the theoreticians for lacking the practical side, they ended by denouncing the practitioners for lacking their own pet theories. Their failure to understand the Workers' Co-operatives for example, says Buber,

... may well serve as a symbol of the tragic mis-development of the Socialist Movement. . . It did not look to the lineaments of the new society which were there for all to see; it made no serious effort to promote, influence, direct, coordinate and federate the experiments that were in being or about to be; never by any consistent work did it of its own accord call any cell-groups and associations of cell-groups of living community into existence. With all its great powers it lent no hand to shaping the new social life for mankind which was to be set free by the Revolution.⁵

In other words the Marxian movement which began in opposition to theorizing ended in opposition to practicality, and all for the sake of keeping theory and practice as one.

The subsequent history of Marxism shows an increasingly determined effort to preserve the apparent unity of theory and practice against increasing pressures to force a recognition of their separation. When Lenin's keen sense of practical politics led to the achievement of the revolution in a largely non-capitalistic society,

⁵Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, p. 98.

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an achievement quite contrary to the whole Marxian theory, the claim of unity was put to its greatest test. The social system which was established as a result of such a deviation naturally was widely at variance from the Marxian theory of what would come after the revolution. W. W. Rostow has stated that the variance of practice from theory is so obvious that the Marxian theory today, instead of being a sure foundation, is always a latent threat to the Communist regime.⁶ But the Communists give no sign of recognizing this discrepancy; rather, they appear bent on a gigantic effort to force practice to fit theory on the one hand and to force theory to fit practice on the other.

There is a wealth of examples of the first half of this process — forcing practice to fit theory. Sometimes this takes the form of elaborate pretense, as if the Communists could fool themselves into thinking that their actions were really in accord with their theory. The whole paraphernalia of Soviet elections undertaken as if to ensure the expression of the will of the people gives the impression of being this kind of self-deception. When the deception is practiced on others one cannot be quite sure whether the Communists are simply deceiving or whether they in some way feel that they are telling the truth because they are telling what the practice is according to their theory. Howard Fast in May 1957 tries to fathom this question in his letter to Boris Polevoi:

And why — why, Boris, did you tell us here in New York that the Yiddish writer, Kvitko, was alive and well and living in your apartment house as your neighbor, when he was among those executed and long since dead? Why? Why did you have to lie? Why could you not avoid the question and tell us you did not know or could not discuss it? Why did you lie in so awful and deliberate a manner?⁷

Mannheim would call this the "present seen through the future." It could also be called "practice seen through theory." Because practice and theory must be one it is assumed that what the theory says should be the case must in practice be the case. Liu Shao-chi's long eulogy of a Communist party member as one who has no personal interests or desires apart from those of the Party betrays this same effort to insist that things are as they in theory ought to be.⁸ A doctor who worked in a hospital used by the Communist leaders in a Chinese city reported privately that their principal affliction was stomach ulcers. In the light of such facts the very extremity of the Communist dedication and effort, which we have acknowledged, appears as a gigantic and ruthless forcing by Communists of themselves into the mould of their own theory.

⁶*Dynamics of Soviet Society*, p. 203-4.

⁷*New York Times Magazine*, June 9, 1957, p. 34.

⁸"The Training of a Communist Party Member" in Boyd Compton, *Mao's China*.

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On the other hand there is an equally determined effort to force the theory into the mould of practice. Whatever the practice may be and however it may twist and turn, the theory has to be twisted and turned equally. Adam Ulam has pointed out that even the most simple, pragmatic decision made by Stalin had to be provided with some foundation out of Communist theory. Only if the theory could be drawn in to support every policy could the sacrifices imposed by the regime be justified and be elicited from the people.⁹ So the theory must always be appealed to in support of practice. And yet, if what W. W. Rostow says is true, the appeal to theory not only supports the regime but also endangers it. What is most necessary is also most perilous.

The forcing of theory to fit practice has become the background for totalitarian dictatorship under Communism. If it were true that, as Marx believed, Communist man could see the truth and do the right, if in other words his theory and practice actually were one, then presumably there would be unanimity in all things and the truth which was seen by the Communist theory would be done by the Communist people. The result of this embodiment of truth and right might be called a totalitarian unity, and yet presumably it would not be a dictatorial or enforced totalitarianism. Real unity of theory and practice would bring a totalitarianism of agreement. The Communist leaders might well decide everything since, according to the Marxian system, they would be able to speak for all humanity and act according to the true interests of mankind, but the masses of mankind, who also had this unity of insight and action, would inevitably agree with the decisions made by their leaders. But since the unity of theory and practice has broken down and rather than being something real is something pretended and forced, the agreement and unanimity must also be pretended and forced. The tyrannical type of totalitarianism with which Communism is generally associated comes into existence as a result. This is not what Communists had in mind; this is not what their system calls for and is not really what they expect from it. But because the system is predicated on a non-existent unity of theory and practice this inevitably is what they are left with. They have to force the unanimity which should come naturally. They have to make people think in accordance with the Communist outlook which should be self-evident truth to them.

Even Mao Tse-tung's famous speech of February 1957, which talked about contradictions "within the working class" and letting "a hundred flowers blossom," though it gave hope for change, was still filled with the old illusion of unity. Contradictions among the people are for Mao contradictions without antagonism. They are founded in a basic unity and out of them fresh unity emerges. A hundred flowers may blossom in the field of art and science, but when it comes to Marxism freedom is only legitimate as long as it aids Marxian truth to overcome other

⁹In E. J. Simmons, *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, p. 168.

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views. Other views are regarded as bourgeois and petty-bourgeois products while the working class is identified with Marxism, and Marxism, consequently, is identified with truth.

Mao's regime has in fact given some of the most obvious evidences of forcing all men's theory to fit the Communist practice. During the land reforms intellectuals were sent to work in the villages where they were to see the revolution in practice. Their theory was expected then to fit this practice, any other theory would be classed as mere idealism since it would not reflect reality, and would not deserve to be heard. Theory *had* to fit practice. As Marx said, under socialism men would not have to look within themselves for theory but simply take note of what was going on outside.

So it is that the unity of theory and practice has become the intellectual prison of those who live under Communist power and equally the self-inflicted lash over the heads of the Communists themselves. This is a doctrine which has kept them from seeing many of the actualities of their rule. It is a claim which has in fact kept them from speaking for humanity, the very thing it was meant to guarantee, because such a claim has made for pride, aloofness, and unconcern and thus separated Communists from other men. Under its goading they have accomplished marvels in the way of putting their theory into practice, and yet the more they force themselves in that direction, the more do the contradictions of the position assert themselves and the more extreme have to be the efforts to keep up the pretense.

After seeing all these consequences of the demand for unity in theory and practice, one may come back with some feeling of relief to those men of the West and of Christian conviction who acknowledge that they do *not* live according to their beliefs. The relief experienced among such people is in the first instance simply the relief that comes naturally in the presence of acknowledged sinners. People who claim to be good are most assuredly hiding something about themselves. There is therefore always something uncomfortable and necessarily something suspect about the person who is good. But the person who is admittedly bad is a person who is not hiding something about himself. So far as he acknowledges his evil, he is just what he appears to be. (There are, to be sure, people with guilt complexes who invent "sins" in order to feel bad about themselves, but such people do not acknowledge or deal with their real evil which is the guilt complex and hence cannot be said to have gone very far in admitting their sin.) It is perhaps because of these facts that writers enjoy choosing bad characters as their heroes. There is a fundamental honesty about the bad character that is missing in the so-called good person. In a way, since honesty is the basic virtue on which all others must be built, the bad person is basically good and the good person is basically bad.

Christianity, then, starts with this common recognition of the honesty of the acknowledged sinner. It goes still further into contrast with Communism by

maintaining that even better than the acknowledged sinner is the repentant sinner. By the repentant sinner, it should be made clear, Christianity does not mean the virtuous person who repents of sins now past, for that kind of repentance would have all the unreality and suspect quality of any other claim to present goodness. Here is meant rather the one who acknowledges his *present* sinfulness and repents of it. Such a one by the act of repentance stands outside his sinfulness as he both acknowledges and repents of it. He is thus in a way separated from sin while he is most certainly a sinner. This is the position in which the Christian finds himself, as Paul makes clear in the last verses of the sixth chapter of Romans. The verse we have already quoted, "I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate," is followed by the words, "So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me." The repentant sinner is then from this point of view at the highest level of goodness which men can reach. As Jesus said, "there is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner that repents than over ninety-nine righteous men who have no need of repentance." This is not because heaven is happier over progress than over achievement but rather because the repentant sinner is a hundred times better than the righteous man — he is at a higher level of righteousness.

The Christian is able to be a repentant sinner, that is, to acknowledge the separation between his theory and practice, because he knows of forgiveness. He knows that as a sinner he does not stand condemned but stands forgiven. Therefore he can admit the separation between his theory and practice. If his sin had the power to condemn him, then he, like the Communist, would not dare to admit it, for the admission, as in the Communist purges, could only be the signal for his undoing. He would have to bend every effort to declaring and assuring his righteousness. But because he knows that "there is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus," he does not need to hide or suppress his sinfulness. Once the power if sin to condemn him is gone, he does not need to worry about sin. *Its power over him is gone.*

There is a danger in this Christian approach to the problem which the Communist is quick to point out. The danger is that it will allow men to relax comfortably in the frank admission that they do not practice what they preach. "Christ allowed the rich young ruler to go away sorrowful with his riches. A Communist would not have allowed him to get away," says *The Communist* (No. 13, 1954. Translated by Nicholas Goncharoff). There is force in this criticism which must be acknowledged and the problem which it raises must be met. But it must be met in a way which does justice to the Christian Gospel. Too often those who recognize this problem try to solve it by a call to greater strenuousness and achievement on the part of Christians, thus selling short the Gospel as another demand for unity of theory and practice.

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John Macmurray in his famous comparison of Communism and Christianity called upon Christians to transform their sense of universal community into an active force rather than a passive ideal in the world, to make their actions fit their doctrines after the pattern of Jesus' life.

The teaching of Jesus is not something separable from his life; it is the expression of the understanding which grew out of his life. Theory and practice are there completely unified. The one interprets and expounds the other. It is this fusion of insight and action that makes the life of Jesus the religious life *par excellence*.¹⁰

It may be asked whether the truly religious life from the Christian point of view is not that which relies on the love of God rather than that which fuses insight and action. The latter view of course makes the Communists more truly religious as Macmurray admits them to be. But Christians cannot get away from the fact that the Gospel is for sinners. In light of that central fact we must even be cautious about saying, as Alexander Miller does, that in comparison with Communists and other people Christians "are called to act more energetically and sacrificially." Christians are indeed called to act in the world of practical politics and public affairs, but they cannot be expected to drive themselves to the energy and sacrifice shown by those who believe their salvation depends on energy and sacrifice. The Christian answer to the Communist criticism of the contradiction in his life does not lie in more Herculean efforts. It lies rather in a new and different way of dealing with the problem.

It is because the power of sin has been destroyed that the Christian finds that, far from relaxing comfortably in the admission of sin, he has been given a new way along which he can move toward the elimination of sin from his life. Because he has been granted justification he can move toward sanctification which would be a unity of preaching and practice. "If we say we have no sin," says the first epistle of John, "we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us (i.e. we are worse than the acknowledged sinners). But if we confess our sins he is faithful and just to forgive us and to cleanse us from all sins." The forgiving must come before the cleansing. But the cleansing will follow. The power of sin being removed with the removal of condemnation, the sin itself can begin to be removed. If the condemnation had not first been taken away, the person would be unable to diminish the sin for he would be under its power. But once the condemnation is gone and he is free from worrying about the sin and what it can do to him, he is able to admit it, repent of it, even laugh at it ("forgetting those things which are behind"), and set about the task of removing it. Thus the removal of condemnation results in the removing of sin even while one is still a sinner.

¹⁰*Creative Society*, p. 88.

¹¹*The Christian Significance of Karl Marx*, p. 97.

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Psychiatrists have well reminded us that we cannot become strong and whole persons till we get rid of our guilt feelings, till we stop weakening and dwarfing ourselves by our practice of self-condemnation. Sometimes, to be sure, it is suggested that the guilt feelings be dismissed by denying the fact of sin, and when this is done the consequences are likely to be of a kind which accompany the Communist denial of sin. But the guilt can better be erased not by the denial of sin but by the acceptance of forgiveness. And then the sin can be overcome. A man who comes to terms with himself as a self-alienated person overcomes that alienation even while remaining self-alienated. Similarly, by admitting sin one overcomes sin, provided one admits it in a context of forgiveness. It is to this kind of patient, assured, undiscourageable dealing with the problem that the Christian is challenged by Communism rather than to a frantic effort to duplicate the Promethean approach of the Communists themselves.

Because the Christian lives in the widest context of forgiveness he can be most hopeful of overcoming sin. The Christian sees forgiveness in the very heart of ultimate reality, in the heart of God. The contrary, and customary, human expectation, as is shown by systems as opposed to those of Hinduism and Communism, of the yogi and the commissar, as Arthur Koestler would put the two extremes of human life, is that if there is sin there must be condemnation. Therefore the demand for immediate sinlessness. Therefore the awful struggles and self-driving of both yogi and commissar, the one through asceticism, the other through activism. But Christianity comes with the incredible message of sin without condemnation. If the Communist can hear that message and believe it, then the shackles will simultaneously fall off him and off those whom he has enslaved. And the way will be opened to move toward that unity of theory and practice whose false claim has so corrupted his existence. The hope for him lies in hearing at last the words, "Neither do I condemn you. Go and sin no more."

Apollo and Dionysius

A View of Student Activities

HERBERT STROUP

Obviously every theory of student activities rests ultimately upon a doctrine of man, his nature and destiny. It is the fate of student activities today to be held within the grip of a certain interpretation of human nature without fully recognizing its power and its limitations.

In brief, there are historically three rival doctrines of man which are relevant to the current situation in student activities. Two derive from the Greek tradition, while the other's roots go deep into the Judaeo-Christian heritage. It was characteristic of Apollonian rationalism to stress the appropriate balance of life, its form and harmony based in reason, "nothing to excess," the efficacy of plain reason. Apollonianism is formalism. On the other hand, Dionysian dynamism, another Greek product, emphasized vitality, movement (both creative and destructive), tragedy, the non-rational (today often termed voluntaristic and "liberal"). Dionysianism is voluntarism.¹ Apollonianism and Dionysianism each claimed hegemony over man and his world: Reason and process became rival supremacies, yet they were later interpreted as complementaries. Blending in popular thought as extreme and would-be exclusive tendencies in thought and life regularly do, these two philosophies of the nature of man provided an important historical and theoretical setting in which the modern doctrine — the "liberal" doctrine — of man developed.

It is the combination of the Apollonian and the Dionysian views of man that student activities to a significant degree currently has adopted for its own "student personnel point of view." The stress upon the use of reason as the guide to the mature and satisfying life, the implicit pacifism whereby it is assumed that all human problems (especially those of an interpersonal nature) can successfully be solved through rational applications, the belief that "science" is the pre-eminent rule of intelligent life and the clue to wisdom, the idea that tradition, race, class and other "ambiguities" of social existence are somehow fanciful and transitory — these and other characteristics of the Apollonian view are deeply and simply expressed in student activities within the university. But, also accepting the other Greek contribution, student activities carefully notes the importance of process (even magnifying it in

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¹ Reinhold Niebuhr speaks about the "unresolved conflict between the Olympian and the Dionysian, the rational and the vitalistic, principles in Greek thought." *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Volume I. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945, p. 8. But I prefer to permit Olympus to be the "arbiter" between the two principles or "the ground of existence." A review of the Apollo myths will affirm, I believe, the justification for my choice.

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a few instances into an absolute). It admits the stress and strain of "political" considerations (within the student body, student-faculty relations, and involving students, faculty, and administrators). Moreover, it is seriously aware of the need for the voluntaristic character of its enterprise (as divorced from the requirements of the curricular phase of the university). In these and other ways student activities gives expression to the basically Greek conceptions of the nature of man, conceptions on which the professional worker in student activities has so largely built his theory and practice.

The Judaeo-Christian tradition is similar yet dissimilar to Greek views of man. It disagrees with the heavy stress of the Apollonians on the cyclicalism of history and favors a belief in the forward movement of man's development in society. The Judaeo-Christian view moreover understands the strong potentials of reason, yet holds reason, like the whole of man, to be tainted with pride and therefore with sin. Reason is a wonderful tool when employed within its limitations — the best man has — yet it also stands under God's judgment of being less than God and thus a creaturely virtue. Therefore there are human problems (our time seems to have its full share) in which reason cannot provide a solution. Rather it may be assumed that reason itself enters into the "defect" of the situation. But in the Judaeo-Christian view reason (which calls for justice) may be transformed by "grace" or "love" and find its true dimension and function in human affairs. Thus reason in the Apollonian sense is redeemed by an extra-rational element, although this "element" in itself is a fundamental expression of human creatureliness and is clearly not anti-rational. In this manner the Judaeo-Christian view both agrees with and supplements the Apollonian view of man.

The Judaeo-Christian view knows full well the tragic sense of life as did the Dionysians, yet it places intrinsic emphasis not only upon the Fall, universal guilt and man's rebellion against God, but also upon creation, the incarnation, the Holy Spirit as the guide of life, salvation, and the eternal life. Dionysianism never really had an explanation of human tragedy; it saw it as a function of merciless fate. The Judaeo-Christian conception of man also appreciates the virtue of voluntarism, as did Dionysianism. It understands that freedom is an essential condition to man's moral responsibility and that creativity itself is rooted in this virtue. In the Protestant formulation the individual is in one context the supreme criterion of truth, beauty, and goodness. The individual is "saved by faith," but such salvation is an *act* of the whole individual and not a function simply of his intellectuality. Such acceptance of voluntarism however tended, in contrast to the static rationalism of medieval Thomism and the rationalistic fruits of the Renaissance, to produce in its extreme form an anti-Christian arbitrariness. It glorified the "rights" of man, special status derived from wealth, race, and nationality, the "right to be wrong" ideas of growing youth (and of all ages, of course), and the irrational acceptance of the irrational. The hard use of reason in relation to God became the soft use of reason toward

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man and his goodness. Thus reason became a tool in Dionysian spirit to justify the essentially non-rational "instincts" (needs, drives, etc.) of man.²

Yet the Judaeo-Christian tradition accepts the voluntarism of Dionysianism but with qualification. The core of the restraint which the Judaeo-Christian standpoint places upon runaway Dionysianism is that of inclusive and ethical loyalty. That is, the Judaeo-Christian tradition is troubled with man's disparities and demonries. It cannot believe that all "urges" are good. There must be hierarchy in values and discrimination through reason of standards by which voluntarisms may be judged to be truly human values or disvalues. But in Dionysian "liberalism" the corrosions of skeptical (scientific) thinking have been equated with a decisionless, neutralistic optimism about man's ethical abilities. Uncommittedness and frustratedness have gone hand in hand. Absolute voluntarism can only bring about absolute chaos morally and socially. But freedom, says the Judaeo-Christian tradition, is pre-conditioned by order; freedom and order are complementary expressions of the unitary character of the self and of the universe. There is no such thing as freedom standing by itself.³ It is "freedom under God." The character of the restraint that Dionysian voluntarism seeks to negate is a defensible, ontological, rational ethicism based upon the nature of the Creator. To some degree then the structures of reason are applicable to the discovery of this ethicism (natural theology), although ultimately the *mysterium tremendum* of the Source is ever beyond man's grasp and at times breaks into his ideas and social forms of the ethicism, splitting them open and "laying them waste."

The contribution of the Judaeo-Christian viewpoint to the understanding and improvement of student activities theory is manifest. Several aspects of the contribution may be mentioned and discussed briefly:

1. Limited reason

The student activities worker assumes that reason and its use are not the final purposes of the student activities program, although reason plays a definite objective in it. "Scientific" ways of doing things within the group are to be sought, but not as an end in themselves but as means to a more final goal — the establishment of a community of justice and love. The ethical requirements of both justice and love need the

²Nietzsche in *Birth of Tragedy* probably overemphasizes his indebtedness to the Dionysian principle in Greek thought.

³This point is clearly seen in the following: "There is also a confusion about authority in a democracy. One faculty member said seriously, in speaking of a student, 'I didn't know whether to tell him he had to, or to be democratic and let him do as he pleased.' Democracy does not mean the absence of authority. The difference between democracy and totalitarianism is not in the degree of authority, but in its source and use." Esther Lloyd-Jones and Margaret Ruth Smith, editors, *Student Personnel Work as Deeper Teaching*. New York: Harper, 1954, p. 132.

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full use of reason, but they transcend reason often and at significant points. Without an acceptance of this extra-rational component the worker would seldom if ever attempt the daring, the novel, the chance that is implicit in his work as a professional person.

Moreover the forms in which student activities programs are organized (reason in application) are not ends in themselves. It is to be assumed that reason cannot of itself provide systematic "answers" to such "questions" as what comprises the best form of student government, the finest means of sanctioning student groups, the most satisfactory ways of relating the university to fraternities. Reason of course must be employed as vigorously as possible in all efforts to provide organization, structure, and form in student activities. Yet reason in itself will not necessarily provide the most defensible form. The role of university tradition, to use only one illustration of the limitation of reason, is apparent in the development of different patterns of practice within different universities. Value may be tied in many instances to the variety of tradition rather than to the unifying force of reason.

2. *Limited Voluntarism*

The student activities leader must assume that voluntarism is not a final virtue, although it plays a definite part in student activities. Self-initiated activities are still the best activities if in addition they meet other qualifications. Thus, as in the use of reason, voluntarism is a means to an end — the establishment of a community in which justice and love flourish. It must stand constantly in the university under the judgment of the structures of order — those structures laid down in the university charter and tradition, its stated educational philosophy, the requirements of efficiency, the delineation and goal of community, and in the ethical bases for evaluation by which hierarchical loyalties may be maintained with appropriate commitment.

The thought that students have "self-government" in any autonomous manner is a distortion not only of the condition of university attendance but of the nature of man's freedom. Students find their freedom within the structures of order within the university. Any freedom worth the name is valuable and efficacious only in that it is based on wider and more ethical foundations of loyalty to the whole of the community. Without a clear recognition of the complementary requirements of the university community as well as the "rights" of students, the freedom desired becomes a rebellious anarchism in which youthfulness may rightly be discussed with the vocabulary of pathology.

3. *Kairos*

Lest it may be said that the previous discussion of reason and voluntarism in the light of the Judaeo-Christian faith condemns more than it permits, it is important briefly to view reason and voluntarism in the context of *kairos*. The Greeks with their fine sense of language have given us *kairos*. It means the right time. It is different from *chronos*, the formal time, in that its accent is upon the moment which is heavy

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with significance and opportunity.⁴ Its use in the New Testament has been amply discussed and its employment in current philosophy has added it to our vocabulary.⁵

Student activities is both a limited form and a limited process (other ways of saying it is based on reason and voluntarism). Insofar as it is both, it calls for a signal appreciation of the moment, the moment freighted with meaning and openness. For it is in the moment that decision is required and that form and process must find their balance and fruition. It is in the moment of decision that the worker must employ his skill in mustering the most valuable elements in both form and process for the attainment of the human community. In one moment the emphasis may be upon form in the extreme. In other moments it will be upon process in the extreme. But in practically all moments both ideally will be related and blended in such a manner as to produce the greatest measure of student freedom within the greatest development of commitment to community.

Because the leader operates in relationships in which *kairos* exists, he can lay claim to being more than an unskilled workman. He can view himself as an artist or a professional. All of his knowledge, all of the knowledge that science can produce, will not enable him to act intelligently or morally in the *kairos*. Yet he must rest his actions upon the best that science has to offer and must keep humble in spirit (the mode of the scientist) in order to be receptive to better knowledge. On the other hand, to say that the leader must be free to act in the *kairos* does not mean that he is at liberty to do as he pleases. His freedom is his opportunity to express responsibility. The student activities leader is free as the artist is free — free to use his colors and canvas in creative ways — but in his use of freedom to express also his loyalty to standards and traditions in which his freedom ultimately rests.

⁴ Alfred North Whitehead says that "the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophers practically made a discovery which, although it lies on the surface of their writings, they only half-realized. The discovery is that there are two kinds of fluency. One kind is the concrescence which in Locke's language is 'the real internal constitution of a particular existent.' The other kind is the *transition* from particular existent to particular existent." *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*. New York: MacMillan, 1930, pp. 319-320. *Kairos* is the first, not the second meaning.

⁵ An instructive discussion of *kairos* may be found in Paul Tillich's *The Protestant Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 32-51.

Toward A Christian Pragmatism

HOWARD R. BURKLE

Christianity Seems Impractical By Prevailing Standards

College students are virtually unanimous in their contempt for purely contemplative philosophies. They are attracted only by concrete and dynamic views. If a philosophy does not promise immediate and tangible benefits, it has no selling point and does not receive serious consideration. The attitude involved here constitutes a culturally innate principle of verification, a market-place pragmatism, which obscures and prejudices every truth claim. This principle is especially evident in philosophy and religion courses where the subject-matter often lays claim to absolute importance and appeals to the powers of assent. I am especially concerned with the poor impression which the Christian world-view makes when assessed by this standard. Most students simply do not comprehend the profound relevance and power of Christian theism. They are polite toward it, sometimes even eager and reverent, but they do not regard it as a transforming power in the secular problems of contemporary life. In a word, Christianity is impractical. In what follows, impractical will be used in this sense: as the impotence of a point of view, when acted upon, to produce important beneficial consequences in the crucial problem-areas of contemporary affairs.

Nothing will bring this estimate to expression more readily than a candid, anything-goes discussion in the academic setting; and I know of no more effective catalyst for this than John Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* and *A Common Faith*, which develop a powerful attack upon traditional metaphysics and institutional religion. As Dewey sees it, the Christian outlook is deficient because it is contemplative rather than active, mythological rather than factual, speculative instead of controlling, conservative instead of progressive. Dewey regards Christian behavior as deficient because it neglects the real needs of men by channeling energy into sterile meditations on theological fictions; aspires to the beatific vision while people in the street cry for bread; supports authoritarian social structures while the masses struggle for democracy; preaches primitive mythology while the enlightened populace works for a scientifically grounded world-view; distracts men from the challenges of the infinite earthly future by encouraging them to seek the static boredom of eternal life. In short, while men languish for want of courage and self-reliance, Christians advocate submissiveness, moral irresponsibility, and self-hatred.

When a given group of students is confronted by such a view, it responds in a nearly predictable pattern. One group — usually a vocal minority — will behave as if they have at last found a clear statement of the notions which they have been wanting to articulate. Although a little uneasy over the exorbitance of Dewey's

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attack (they have not had much practice in taking unconventional stands), they readily endorse it. They grant that Christianity teaches some important principles such as the Golden Rule, and they concede that the world would be a better place if everyone put these into practice. However this is just the sort of visionary thinking which shows the impracticality of Christianity, and it only reinforces their negative feelings. Regardless of what things might be in some heavenly situation, they are not buying until conditions in this world are more favorable.

Another group — generally composed of those faithful in church attendance — will become incredulous and indignant. They insist that Christianity does work. From personal experience they know that faith provides peace of mind in the face of insoluble perplexity. This group is unaware that they have conceded Dewey's point: that solace for timidity, comfort in failure, and consolation in personal tragedy — however salutary in their place — are no substitute for constructive effort in matters which can be meliorated. When this is pointed out, the reply is usually that when faith is shrewdly applied, it serves as a guide to successful living. Men have made money, gained positions of eminence, overcome social maladjustments, and conquered personality defects — all by the know-how of confident faith.

For all their differences the two factions are alike in their failure to see Christianity as a focal point for the operation of divine creativity in the reconstruction of human affairs. Whereas the proponents of Dewey's critique explicitly reject Christianity as impractical, the other group accepts it (or what it mistakenly thinks is Christianity) *because* it is impractical. Whereas the former group is still hoping for constructive action, the latter has despaired of it and settled for trivial adjustments. Fundamentally they agree however: Christianity has nothing to offer at the crucial levels of need in our time.

If these attitudes are as prevalent and determinative as my experience leads me to suspect, they should be the occasion for deep concern. Here is both a problem and an opportunity. The problem is that these attitudes constitute a web of prejudice and misunderstanding which inevitably blocks the communication of Christian principles. The opportunity is that the student is susceptible to a statement of Christian theism which is germane to the crises of the mid-twentieth century. The seriousness of this need could remind us that a living faith must perpetually read the signs of the time and mobilize its resources to meet changing conditions. If we are to follow this course, we are obliged to develop an authentic Christian pragmatism. Obviously this is a vast project, involving all parts of the "body of faith." I am concerned with the role of the teacher. In the emergency atmosphere of the imminent *eschaton*, the disciples of Jesus hastened to broadcast seed in every patch of soil whether shallow, rocky, or choked with thorns. The present situation is not unlike that. We also work in an emergency atmosphere (whatever we may think about the *eschaton*), and we cannot suspend effort because conditions are adverse. Still the teacher works at a different pace than the evangelist, and it would seem that in the

comparative leisure of the academic setting he could work the soil a bit before the seed is scattered.

Christianity is Essentially Practical

I am assuming that Christianity is practical in the sense indicated earlier. Of course there are some who would not agree. Themes of world-denial are sounded throughout Christian history. The "sectarian" and the "mystic" in Troeltsch's scheme¹, and the "Christ against culture" and "Christ and culture in paradox" positions as outlined in Richard Niebuhr's system², would carry our attention away from the world in rejection and indifference. In the main however Christians have seen themselves "in the world," commissioned to shape the affairs of each historical situation as prompted by the divine power. My concern is to sponsor a more vigorous development of the latter view. Surely Jesus was interested in the beneficial consequences of religious dispositions: "if it bear fruit, well; and if not, then after that thou shalt cut it down." The good fruits are not simply spiritual sentiments relating man to God in moments of private communion. The Second Great Commandment, however subordinate ontologically, is no less important than the First; and the definition of religion as visiting widows and orphans in their affliction has as much Biblical foundation as speaking in tongues. Christian spirituality must issue in action and influence its surrounding, for it is derived from the God who is essentially self-sharing love, who in the "Word which was made flesh and dwelt among us . . . full of grace and truth" offered himself to those in need. Christianity is a transformation of history. History was not the same after the incarnation, and it is not the same now; for from that moment the relation between God and man was transformed at its roots. The tide has already turned and will continue to turn whether or not we throw our efforts with it. The new birth in the community of Christ is meant to produce personality traits which flow forth into the reconstruction of society. In the most profound sense the cultural fruits of Christian spirituality are brotherhood, freedom, and justice.

From this point of view Dewey's critique seems most unfair. He denies to Christianity precisely those traits which others have claimed for it as its unique contribution to religious aspiration. He seems not to understand the historical dimension of Christian experience. The doctrine of creation through the Word establishes this world as fundamentally good and thus deserving of human attention. The doctrine of providence places man in an order of moral and natural law and thus obligates him to intelligent, just behavior. The incarnation enunciates the union of this world with God and thus establishes it as the locus of the divine presence. The resurrection proclaims the triumph of God's will and thus transforms mere destiny into a future of triumph and hope. The doctrine of history relates the cycle of

¹ Ernest Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, New York: Macmillan, 1931, pp. 328-348 and 691-745.

²H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, New York: Harper, 1951, chs. 2 and 5.

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natural occurrences to an infinite future and thus fills each creature with uniqueness, dignity, and creative potential. All in all, in the Christian scheme man is called to confident, vigorous participation in the affairs of this world. At least this is the claim. If these convictions are sheer fancy, even if Christians have been insincere in practicing them, they are nonetheless an integral part of the scheme. They can be rejected as untrue or ineffective, but they cannot be treated as non-existent.

A Christian Pragmatism Must Reckon with Three Factors

As one asks why the practical impact of Christian faith is so misunderstood, he might discover the following three factors. Two of them are embedded in the methodological assumptions with which the student operates. First, although he is a seasoned pragmatist, he does not really understand what he is doing. This is a stubborn demon to exorcize. The appeal to consequences is so natural and serviceable that it seems almost ludicrous to question it. As a result he is virtually blind to the ambiguities entailed in all pragmatic criteria. It seems to him that he knows exactly what practicality is and that everyone understands it in the same way. Now in a certain sense this is true, for most everyone agrees that the practical action is the one which works, solves the problem, produces good results, brings success. But a moment's thought will confirm that none of these formulas in itself offers any definite information as to what constitutes a beneficial result. In spite of the surface definiteness, the standard will permit any judgment in the concrete case. On these terms anything from suicide to the beatific vision could pass as a solution. The student does not see that a sound pragmatic criterion must specify the traits by which desirable results can be distinguished from undesirable ones. This is why he has difficulty estimating, or even recognizing, the practical impact of Christianity. He does not know what to look for nor how to test it when he has found it.

This leads to the second factor. Since he is unaware that the validity of a pragmatic criterion depends upon the specifications for recognizing beneficial results, he is also unaware that his pragmatic criterion has become uncritically identified with a particular system of specifications. He assumes that beneficial consequences *mean* happiness, apt adjustment to social pressures, and material-emotional well being. It is not surprising therefore that he is unimpressed and often repelled by Christianity. He uses a set of values which are prejudicial, values which from a Christian point of view can only be regarded as naively hedonistic, materialistic, and naturalistic. Student practicality, very much like the formal doctrine of William James, is a means for judging the true by way of the good. It is a way of assuming that the difficulties in discriminating truth from falsehood can be lessened by an appeal to privately-grounded value standards. This is precisely the chief difficulty. The Christian message is directed to our truncated and distorted value systems. These systems need to be reconstructed before any human aspiration can be correctly assessed. We cannot recognize a good result until we know what good is; and we cannot know the good except in God himself. If in the Athens of Socrates' day man needed to

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recognize his own ignorance before he could approach the truth, in twentieth-century America we need to acknowledge the narrowness of our notions of goodness before we can begin to understand practicality. It is quite as disastrous to be presumptuous about the good as to be arrogant about the true.

There is a third factor which has to do not so much with the attitude of the student as with Christian religiosity itself. This is the special nature of the relationship, "the dialectic of revelation," within which Christian standards are discovered. Sensitivity to God's revealing act requires a personal involvement, and this in turn precludes understanding based upon detached objectivity. Conditioned — and sometimes even trained — to think by the method of the sciences, the student is bewildered by the subjectivity of religious knowledge. Subjectivity and irrationality are nearly synonymous in his mind. He stands receptive but stolid before the Christian view, waiting for the data to make him an offer. "This is a classroom, not the 'sawdust trail'," he is thinking. He is uncomfortable before a truth which seeks him, which commands that he yield to its act of solicitation before making any terms. Every inclination prompts the student to depersonalize this truth, to translate the Thou into an object, specifically a system of ideals which he can measure against his common sense principles. He rejects the theistic frame of reference within which he must stand, if not in genuine faith then in intellectual sympathy, if he is to comprehend what God performs through men. Thus disposed, he never really gets inside the perspective from which Christian claims can be validated not understands that in the Christian view practical results cannot be conceived apart from the relation to God. Results are not ends-in-themselves but by-products accruing to man as a result of the prior dedication of all desires to the divine will. He does not see that Christian practicality arises out of a religious context in which God himself is the Good, and man's pursuit of earthly ends a reflexive and responsive creation of derivative goods.

This explains not only why the student does not grasp the practicality of Christianity, but also why he agrees when critics call it contemplative. He notes the command to love God and seek his Kingdom; intellectually he follows this Godward movement. But then he loses the thread by which the return to the world takes place. He does not see the responding movement, how genuine love for God sends the worshiper back into the world empowered by a divine inclination to benefit all being. He does not see that, when man discovers that he is loved by God and responds to this in a human way of trust, he must follow the newly generated dispositions toward the needs of other men. Misunderstanding of the movement to the world hides the distinctively Christian criteria from him. He does not see the divine standards by which the human problem is diagnosed; he does not share the vision of the End and ends toward which the human quest is directed; he feels no assurance that these ends are feasible or valuable; he has no confidence that God offers resources for the elevation of motives; he has no conviction that man participates in an effort for good larger than any individual, deeper and more lasting than humanity itself. Is it surprising that, when these claims are spelled out in propositional form, he blinks in

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amazement? He is looking for a device to help him solve problems, but in faith he is confronted by a personal involvement which threatens to change him. He assumes that his problems reside in the environment, but in faith he finds himself confronted with a judgment which locates the root of his problem in himself. Christianity is first salvational and then ethical. This is the distinctive nature of Christian pragmatism. It requires not only understanding and action, but first response to grace. In the explication of this point the teacher can make his most significant contribution.

Prognosis and Prescription

Since an adequate understanding of Christianity is contingent upon the altered relation to God — "conversion," "rebirth," "spiritual enlightenment" — the role of the teacher is a modest one. "The spirit blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes . . . Are you a teacher of Israel, and yet you do not understand this?" Briefly we should weigh our legitimate expectations and formulate a strategy for making the most of the possibilities at hand.

Turning to the negative first: it should not be expected that the full roster of Christian beliefs can be grasped with maximal understanding under the conditions of formal instruction. Since Christianity is less a system of thought than the life of persons rooted organically in the special community of divine love, part of its meaning will necessarily be left behind when translated into the propositional form of classroom discourse. The student who has not shared richly in the community of experience to which the discourse refers will be unable to attach the same meaning to the discourse as those who have shared the experience. I do not mean to establish an absolute dichotomy between special and general revelation. In some sense the invisible things of God are discernible in the "things that are made." Nonetheless it would seem that the "things that are made" cannot yield their whole content apart from some illumination from the deity through whom they have their meaning. This, I take it, is what is implied by Jesus' warning that "no one comes to the Father except by the Son." This is not to say that all Christian beliefs are entirely incomprehensible except to Christians. Christians do not possess the Son, nor monopolize his illuminating activity. Surely the light of God is received in some authentic sense in all religions, and indeed wherever truth is discovered. Thus it can be assumed that both the content and the method of Christianity have analogues in the general experience of mankind. In a moment I shall make a suggestion for developing the positive side of this point; but at present it is important to observe that however successful one may be in explicating the internal dimensions of Christian meaning, he can never hope to do it fully or exactly.

Second, one ought to recognize that even the most effective presentation of the Christian position cannot be expected to produce "decisions for Christ." It is not unthinkable that a clarified understanding might be instrumental in such a decision

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or occasionally even a direct cause; but by and large, belief is not brought about by philosophical analysis. I am not about to recommend altar-calls in the classroom. My intention is simply to be clear about what may be hoped for in an academically licit presentation of Christian theism. Even if the teacher feels the most intense interest in the reception accorded the Christian position, he should do nothing more on its behalf than he would do for any other position. The most we have a right to expect is that Christianity will receive a reasonable, sympathetic scrutiny. We should not be distressed that this does not produce believers.

On the positive side, surely it is reasonable to think that the student can overcome his habit of employing pragmatic criteria uncritically. This requires the willingness to turn an honest eye upon his own practices and the effort to analyze pragmatic procedures with detachment. If this is accomplished with reasonable thoroughness, the student can know what to look for in order to judge the Christian claim to practicality. Second, it should be possible for the student to gain insight into his naturalistic presuppositions. This will require a willingness to scrutinize carefully the conflict between his views and those of other positions, such as Christian theism; and it will require him to resist the tendency to label the conflicting views untrue *because* they disagree with his predilections. If this can be achieved, then whether he abandons or repossesses his naturalism, he will be in a better position to judge Christianity in terms of the evidence at hand. Third, the student will then be in a position to acquire some understanding — however schematic and external — of the major features of the Christian view. This is the positive side of the earlier statement to the effect that Christian ideas cannot be communicated without some loss of meaning. Even if the student does not grasp Christianity from within, he can be helped to understand it by analogy with other areas of his experience. He can see roughly what the Christian means by validation through participation and can gain some understanding of why the Christian regards detached observation as inadequate. This is a crucial point; unless it is made lucid the student sees little except an arbitrary choice between blind faith and naked rationalism. The student is sensitive to this problem, for he has been taught that one should understand what he accepts. Naturally he resents the invitation to leap passionately into any unproved belief. It is important to show, if we can, that the method of faith is not anomalous. If a kinship with something familiar can be established, much of the shock can be removed from the invitation to personal involvement and the student will not reject the theistic relationship before he has had an opportunity to consider it.

How is this to be done? Undoubtedly there are numerous approaches. I should like to suggest one approach which seems promising. In view of our cultural tendency toward scientific modes of thought — which rest ultimately on a pragmatic basis — it might be useful to point out that faith bears some resemblance to scientific method; that faith is analogous to the method which requires that a notion be acted upon to be tested. This parallel might be explained in the following analogies between religious and scientific validation.

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1. Both science and faith are appeals to experience, requiring the subject to sensitize and accommodate himself to an order of things which exists independent of his mind. Though the mind is active in shaping and interpreting the experience, it must receive its data. The dissimilarities must not be ignored: that the objective order with which faith works is an absolute Subject; that faith is an activity of the whole person rather than reason primarily; that faith is not exploitative or coolly contemplative in its approach. Still, the analogous element remains. The knower must conform to a given order which he comes to know through direct experience.

2. Both faith and science require the serious consideration of unverified truth-claims; neither waits passively until truth establishes itself; neither demands certainty before committing itself. Once more there are differences. The scientist does not permit his personal hopes and preferences to influence the verification of the hypothesis, whereas the believer must submit his personal destiny to the "hypothesis" and manifest intense interest in its authenticity. Still the parallel is close enough to give some suggestion as to what transpires in the faith perspective and to reassure the outsider that faith is not the crucifixion of the intellect.

3. Both faith and science attempt to validate hypotheses by way of action, and both submit their conclusions to communal certification. Neither is a way of *a priori* legislation nor a sanctuary for private preference. Again the differences are prominent. In the case of science the verifying activities or experiments are imaginatively and ingeniously invented on the basis of deductions from established knowledge, whereas in faith the interpretative patterns are provided by divine revelation out of the history of divine-human intercourse. In science the investigations are conducted in order to harness nature to human needs or to satisfy curiosity about natural grandeur, while in faith the inquiry is conducted in order to make sense out of the moral-spiritual dilemmas of man's relation to other men, nature, and God. In science the range of communal discourse is as wide as those qualified by training to understand the issues, while in faith the community is only as inclusive as those who share the same faith. Nonetheless the resemblance between faith and science is close enough to take some of the strange quality away: in both cases men approach the problems, threats, and obscurities of the mysterious environment armed with interpretative patterns which, when acted upon adventuresomely, illuminate the hidden meanings and give suggestions for productive adjustments.³

This is but one possible route by which the student may be led toward understanding that Christianity is committed to the needs of this world. It has at least one serious deficiency: it may be regarded as an attempt to ride into relevance on the coat-tails of science. The student tends to assume that science is perfect reason and pure certainty. Under these conditions faith cannot hope to be considered more

³The religious aspect of this methodology is developed in detail in H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Meaning of Revelation*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1946.

than a distant and poor relation. The aim is to have religious experience emerge as a distinct entity. Whether this is accomplished or not, the appeal to analogy is inevitable so long as the student does not know the meaning of faith through direct personal experience. Even to the student of deep religious experience the appeal to analogy is useful as a means for relating faith to other areas of human aspiration. There is bound to be a deficiency in every approach, for as Tillich points out, there seems to be something about faith which destines it inevitably to be misunderstood.⁴ Whichever approach will help to reduce the misunderstanding is worth being tried.

This approach has the advantage of directing the campaign against the center of the opposing lines. To liken faith to scientific method serves to restore religion to the main area of human concern. Not only does it help to make faith more familiar, but it calls attention to the limitations of science of which the student has almost no comprehension. The student has forgotten or has never known what Whitehead points out: that some of the fundamental assumptions of modern science — its belief in the intelligibility and uniformity of nature, its confidence in human reason — have been laboriously cultivated by the Greek and Christian religious traditions.⁵ Thus a direct attempt to draw the parallels between scientific knowledge and religious insight could help to restore historical perspective to the student viewpoint. It may help the student to realize that the modern interest in nature is not simply a product of the Renaissance rejection of medieval supernaturalism. He may come to understand that the desire to direct natural potentialities is as Biblical as the command to Adam to subdue the earth and as ancient as Plato's picture of the demiurge acting to make the world like himself. However distinctively Western and modern the present-day preoccupation with this world may be, it is not in itself, unique. There are various ways of conceiving the matter, and the student must be helped to see this. Perhaps the practical orientation of modern thought has unrecognized affinities with that Love for all being which manifest itself in Jesus Christ and silently inspires all men in the noblest moments of their creativity. It is at least as practical, and perhaps immeasurably more satisfying, to conceive of nature as God's vineyard, to be worked with loving care for his sake, as to conceive of nature as an intriguing mechanism, to be harnessed for human amusement and convenience.

Whatever approach is selected, the effort to emphasize the practical dimension of Christianity is worthwhile. If the student rejects it, he will know more clearly why he has done so; if he accepts it, he will have a more realistic notion of what he is letting himself in for. But whatever the decision, he will not be ignorant that Christianity has serious pretensions to contemporary relevance.

⁴ Paul Tillich, *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, p. 52.

⁵ A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, New York: Macmillan, 1946, Chapter I.

The Idea of the Church in T. S. Eliot

WILLIAM TURNER LEVY

Last summer when the Dean and Chapter invited me to address you on this date on some aspect of T. S. Eliot's religious ideas, I accepted, not lightly, but without realizing the complexity of my task. My first responsibility, I knew, was to offer you, for your trouble in coming here, neither a rehash of what Eliot's innumerable critics have already documented and which is as well known to you as to me, nor a mere footnote, regardless of its originality. The former course would be to bore you with repetition; the latter, to infuriate you with pedantry. In sum, I had to bear in mind that I was discussing an aspect of the work of the most distinguished living poet, the author of the greatest poem of our age, "The Four Quartets."

One observation led me to my choice of subject. The observation was one of astonishment that for a man of letters whose works are so intensively commented upon (to put it kindly), Eliot's best known statement is forever quoted out of context and never afforded critical examination. The statement, pontifically accepted with chagrin as his credo, appeared in the Preface to a collection of essays published in 1928 under the title *For Lancelot Andrewes*. It is contained in two sentences, and I beg your leave to quote them entire. Referring to the essays, he says:

The general point of view may be described as classicist in literature, royalist in politics, and anglo-catholic in religion. I am quite aware that the first term is completely vague, and easily lends itself to clap-trap; I am aware that the second term is at present without definition, and easily lends itself to what is almost worse than clap-trap, I mean temperate conservatism; the third term does not rest with me to define.

First, it is important to notice that the statement is not a gratuitous one but was called forth to clarify his position, unhappily one easy to misunderstand, in an earlier volume of essays, *The Sacred Wood*; second, the statement is offered to (in his own words) "refute any accusation of playing 'possum"; and third, he promised at the conclusion of the Preface three small volumes which would spell out the terms in detail. The terms themselves were not printed in capitals, and the tone could not have been lighter, all things considered. But many of his generation, then as now, intolerant of opinions differing from their own, capitalized them and applied them not to the essays but to the man. Anglo-catholic, the defined term, angered them the most and continued to anger those in the following generation. For justice, I do not say for agreement, Eliot will have to await the coming of those

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who gain critical maturity in the present generation. The romantic-stoic humanism of "A Free Man's Worship" is dead: H. G. Wells died in despair; C. E. M. Joad died in the Church.

Just what image did Anglo-catholicism raise in minds of his readers? They were right to assume that a man's view of the Church is a determining one for his thought and action, but from what those who committed themselves to the partial clarity of print reveal, we may judge that they never sought to discover what the Church was but settled for a vision of the disillusioned Eliot aesthetically swinging an antique and strange-smelling censer. One or two — with more imagination but as little understanding as the rest — saw the Church of England as an untenable halfway house on the road to Rome.

In 1934 Eliot attempted a clarification:

Some years ago, in the preface to a small volume of essays, I made a sort of summary declaration of faith in matters religious, political and literary. The facility with which this statement has been quoted has helped to reveal to me that as it stands the statement is injudicious. It may suggest that the three subjects are of equal importance to me, which is not so; it may suggest that I accept all three beliefs on the same grounds, which is not so; and it may suggest that I believe that they all hang together or fall together, which would be the most serious misunderstanding of all. That there are connexions for me I of course admit, but these illuminate my own mind rather than the external world; and I now see the danger of suggesting to outsiders that the Faith is a political principle or a literary fashion, and the sum of all a dramatic posture.

Well, every man must fear the tyranny of his own cleverness, and Eliot has paid an awkward price. And he is justified in his use of the noun "outsiders," though his miscalculation concerning them is, as he acknowledges, his fault, not theirs. It is perhaps not too flippanant to note that new troubles may yet arise. In the course of his address on "Goethe as the Sage," given in Hamburg in 1955 on the occasion of receiving the Hanseatic Goethe Prize which had been awarded him the year before, Eliot indulged in another tripartite statement, describing himself as one "who combines a Catholic cast of mind, a Calvinistic inheritance, and a Puritanical temperament." Though I believe this to be a judicious description, I cannot forbear thinking "here we go again"!

If we are to toss the "dramatic posture" on the slag heap for good, and that is the thrust of my ambition, we must present evidence that Eliot's idea of the Church is orthodox, a Church which holds that which, in the great phrase of St. Vincent of Lerins, "hath been believed everywhere, always and by all men (*semper, ubique, ab omnibus*)"; and we must show that his understanding of Her doctrine creatively informs his work. If this be demonstrated, then Eliot is more than a great poet, he

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is a Christian and writes profoundly in prose and verse out of that humility which he has called endless.

To shoulder this responsibility adequately, I have been constrained to undertake an essay of some length. Until such time as it is ready for your perusal and judgment, the direction laid down in this lecture may serve to indicate the nature of a scholarly answer to an ignorant slur. Of necessity only a small part of the necessary evidence can be examined, the growth through time and experience largely ignored, and the formative influences neglected. I have elected therefore to discuss six statements in prose, the longest being a short book, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, and the shortest "A Sermon" preached in Magdalene College Chapel. I must beg your indulgence with the stricture that each statement be incompletely dealt with. The order of their examination will be chronological.

Every ten years at Lambeth Conferences assembled, The Church of England, as Eliot succinctly put it, "washes its dirty linen in public." In 1931 he reviewed the Conference of the year before in terms of its own Report. In "Thoughts After Lambeth" he essayed his first theological disquisition, some three years after becoming a communicant of the Church. Although deprecatingly referring to it as "that oddest of institutions," he goes on to point with respect to "the intellectual ability which during two thousand years has gone to its formation." That emphasis on two thousand years — not dating the Church from the Reformation — prepares the way for him later to refer to it as the Catholic Church in England. "Whether established or disestablished," he argues, "the Church of England can never be reduced to the condition of a Sect"; indeed in England the Roman Church is in a sense a sect. Both Churches are the losers in their present state of separation, but if England is ever to be Christianized, it will have to be through the Church of England. We cannot be surprised that the author of "The Waste Land" does not consider England Christian, but more distressing still are those wasted energies to which he pointed when in 1927 he prefaced this quotation from Irving Babbitt to an essay of his own in the *Criterion*: "What is disquieting about the present time is not so much its open and avowed materialism as what it takes to be its spirituality." Eliot's concern with heresy has been constant. But while we are on the subject of the Roman Church, it is of the utmost value to understand Eliot's basic difference with its ethos. He points out that the Roman view is "that a principle must be affirmed without exception; and that thereafter exceptions can be dealt with, without modifying the principle." The English mind, on the other hand, and thus the Church in England, would hold "that a principle must be framed in such a way as to include all allowable exceptions." No one actively engaged in the cure of souls would be likely to deny the accuracy of that definition of the difference in attitude between the two Churches. He recognizes but defends the reality of the plight in which this leaves the Anglican: "The admission of inconsistencies . . . may be largely the admission of inconsistencies inherent in life itself, and of the impossibility of overcoming them by

the imposition of a uniformity greater than life will bear." Not to be misunderstood in dealing with a Church for which he has profound respect based on gratitude for its monumental role in the preservation of Christ's religion, he spells out a specific case:

For example: according to the Roman doctrine, which is more commendable — prudent continence in marriage, or unlimited procreation up to the limit of the mother's strength? If the latter, the Church seems to me obliged to offer some solution to the economic questions raised by such practice: for surely, if you lay down a moral law which leads, in practice, to unfortunate social consequences — such as over-population or destitution — you make yourself responsible for providing some resolution of these consequences. If the former, what motives are right motives? The latest Papal Encyclical appears to be completely decisive about the question . . . — at the cost of solving no individual's problems.

Here quite centrally, if we now forget the example but remember the principle, is Eliot's difference with Rome — a most basic one of ethos — and his argument with authority in any church if that authority become sterile. In *For Lancelot Andrewes* he wrote: "If a religion cannot touch a man's self, so that in the end he is controlling himself instead of being merely controlled by priests as he might be by policemen, then it has failed in its professed task." Speaking specifically at that same time of the Roman Church, he was unequivocal: "One may feel a very deep respect and even love for the Catholic Church, . . . but if one studies its history and vicissitudes, its difficulties and problems past and present, one is struck with admiration and awe certainly, but is not the more tempted to place all the hopes of humanity on one institution."

A second insight into Eliot's idea of the Church has to do in part with that "Puritanical temperament," different now — exhibited perhaps chiefly in a distaste for self-indulgence — from what the pressures of conformity in his youth would have made it. For one of his thoughts after Lambeth concerns the impossibility of morality without faith, for the thinkers of his generation were obsessed with the validity of the world's experiment — still going on — "of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality." He urges recognition of the fact that the moral behavior of a thinking man can only result from an attempt to bring his acts into obedience to the promptings of his belief. As he was to say two years later in the *Criterion*: ". . . a belief which is merely a formulation of the way in which one acts has no validity; unless it turns and compels action of certain kinds in certain circumstances it has no status . . . a philosophy of life which involves no sacrifice turns out in the end to be merely an excuse for being the sort of person that one is." Morality cut off from the roots of faith is a dying flower, and not all the fences of convention thrown up around it can nourish or sustain it. "Christian morals gain immeasurably in richness and freedom by being seen as the consequence of Christian faith, and not as the imposition of tyrannical and irrational habit." Thence Eliot's attack

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on the conventional: "One of the most deadening influences upon the Church in the past, ever since the eighteenth century, was its acceptance, by the upper, upper middle and aspiring classes, as a political necessity and as a requirement of respectability." From his earliest days he had reason to know the force and aridity of outward form. A poem appearing in *The Harvard Advocate* in 1910 is nothing if not based upon painful experience. It reads:

Sunday ; this satisfied procession
Of definitely Sunday faces ;
Bonnets, silk hats, and conscious graces
In repetition that displaces
Your mental self-possession
By this unwarranted digression.

Evening, lights, and tea.
Children and cats in the alley ;
Dejection unable to rally
Against this dull conspiracy.

And Life, a little bald and gray,
Waits, hats and gloves in hand,
Languid, fastidious, and bland,
Punctilious to tie and suit
(Somewhat impatient of delay)
On the doorstep of the Absolute.

It is entitled "Spleen." In 1937 Eliot remembered all this while writing an "Introduction" to the American edition of *Nightwood*. This is how he put it then:

In the Puritan morality that I remember, it was tacitly assumed that if one was thrifty, enterprising, intelligent, practical and prudent in not violating social conventions, one ought to have a happy and "successful" life. Failure was due to some weakness or perversity peculiar to the individual ; but the decent man need have no nightmares. It is now rather more common to assume that all individual misery is the fault of "society," and is remediable by alterations from without. Fundamentally, the two philosophies, however different they may appear in operation, are the same. It seems to me that all of us, so far as we attach ourselves to created objects and surrender our wills to temporal ends, are eaten by the same worm.

No wonder Eliot emphasizes discipline and asceticism. He surely believes that, if a man keeps his gift of freedom, he becomes his own and the world's slave : he must give it to God, Whose service alone is perfect freedom. Eliot's gratitude to the

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Church for its preservation of the Truth can be reckoned in terms of what he escaped from and what he has entered into. He learned the difference between Good and Evil — the moral categories — and the merely Puritan forms of Right and Wrong. But we must turn now to the second exhibit of the day.

The essay on "Revelation" was published in 1937 in a volume of the same title containing six other statements on the subject by the six theologians: Baillie, Barth, Temple, Bulgakoff, D'Arcy, Horton, and Aulén. The volume was the fruit of a decade of preparation for three great conferences which were international in scope: the World Conference on Faith and Order (Edinburgh 1937), the Universal Christian Council on Life and Work (Oxford 1937), and the International Missionary Council (Hangchow 1938). Eliot's contribution is an introduction to the subject, and he holds that "the division between those who accept and those who deny Christian revelation I take to be the most profound division between human beings." Pursuing this observation, Eliot assumes "the wholesome reflection that not all those who deny Christ are necessarily His enemies, and that many who profess Him are living by the World." This is because there are many persons who, not knowing what orthodoxy is, hate it; and many whose Christianity is traditional rather than a matter of individual conversion. Three years earlier he put it this way in one of the choruses of "The Rock":

The Church must be forever building, for it is forever
decaying within and attacked from without;
For this is the law of life; and you must remember that
while there is time of prosperity
The people will neglect the Temple, and in time of
adversity they will decry it.

Yet the Church alone can give meaning to the common human enterprise:

What life have you if you have not life together?
There is no life that is not in community,
And no community not lived in praise of God.
Even the anchorite who meditates alone,
For whom the days and nights repeat the praise of God,
Prays for the Church, the Body of Christ incarnate.

But community defines the coming together of individuals. The chorus derides Communism, Fascism, Capitalism in contrast:

We speak to you as individual men;
As individuals alone with God.
Alone with God, you first learn brotherhood with men.

In "Revelation" Eliot reveals several levels of his comprehension of the Christian life. It is important for us to see that he calls the Christian revelation the only full one — because of the Incarnation. That he is not taken in by labels, but seeks to

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examine the fruit. That he comprehends the yearning of the secular human spirit toward a fulfillment in belief which it is too ashamed to acknowledge or even allow to come to consciousness. That he fears secular acceptance of objectives too limited to be Christian: to those content with morality he says, "Christian morality is not an end but a means"; to those seeking peace as an end he says, "... peace itself (the peace of this world) is not an end but a means." That he calls the Faith "frightening, frightful and scandalous" not only to the secular mind but to the secular mind shared to some extent by all Christians. That he distinguishes higher and lower religious motives: "We can cry, 'Thou son of David, have mercy on me,' but we can be healed only if our faith is stronger even than our desire to be healed." That he warns of "the great gulf between the Christian mind and the secular habits of thought and feeling into which, so far as we fail to watch and pray, we all tend to fall."

May it not be one of Eliot's greatest contributions to the thought of our time, that he has defined the humanistic experiment for us, skillfully, unsparingly, and without bitterness? The fruits of his achievement are already to be found in the intellectual and spiritual temper of the generation to which I belong. Eliot has got much into focus: remember this in "The Rock"?

Why should men love the Church? Why should they love her laws?

She tells them of Life and Death, and of all that they would forget.

She is tender where they would be hard, and hard where they like to be soft.

She tells them of Evil and Sin, and other unpleasant facts.

They constantly try to escape

From the darkness outside and within

By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.

"Revelation" contains an intimate and sympathetic understanding of the secular mind, and Eliot believes that many conversions to Christianity will be due to dissatisfactions with the limited nature of secular answers. "So far as we are human, What we do must be either evil or good"; this he says (on the authority of Romans 6:16) in his perceptive essay on Baudelaire whose business, as Eliot sees it, was "not to practice Christianity, but — what was much more important for his time — to assert its *necessity*." Baudelaire, he feels sure, would have approved this paragraph of T. E. Hulme's:

In the light of these absolute values, man himself is judged to be essentially limited and imperfect. He is endowed with Original Sin. While he can occasionally accomplish acts which partake of perfection, he can never himself *be* perfect. Certain secondary results in regard to ordinary human action in society follow from this. A man is essentially bad, he can only accomplish anything of value by discipline — ethical and political. Order is thus not merely negative, but creative and liberating. Institutions are necessary.

We shall have occasion to revert to this aspect of Eliot's own cast of thought in 'just a moment when we come to examine *The Idea of a Christian Society*. I would only add that to Eliot's essay on Baudelaire he added an equally perceptive one on Pascal. Nor should we be surprised by his high praise for Montaigne. Whatever else Eliot's mind may be, it is not closed: he acknowledges kinship with all who strive toward truth: in what he considers their measure he has praised both Maurras and Babbitt.

In 1940 *The Idea of a Christian Society* appeared accompanied by generally un-understanding reviews; since then it has been ignored, as has *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* which is dated eight years later. The first thing to recognize about this carefully reasoned and very significant work of Eliot's is that it was inspired by the author's reactions to the Munich Pact. He refers to himself as having been "deeply shaken . . . in a way from which one does not recover"; he received it with "a feeling of humiliation, which seemed to demand an act of personal contrition, of humility, repentance and amendment; what had happened was something in which one was deeply implicated and responsible." The mood was one of "doubt of the validity of a civilization. We could not match conviction with conviction, we had no ideas with which we could either meet or oppose the ideas opposed to us. Was our society, which had always been so assured of its superiority and rectitude, so confident of its unexamined premises, assembled round anything more permanent than a congeries of banks, insurance companies and industries, and had it any beliefs more essential than a belief in compound interest and the maintenance of dividends?" You will perceive that the shock is best conveyed to us in the new frankness with which Eliot is to attack, as the dominating vice of our time, avarice. And he will attack what Carlyle called the "cash nexus" with rigor and specifically. What he felt of materialism from his youthtime up, what he attacked as the world's vulgarity or smugness in the early poems, what he learned in the world of business, what he drew from the Church's classical position, what friends or acquaintances like Mannheim and Dawson and Temple and Demant and Niebuhr were saying and writing, all came together in this historic September of moral bankruptcy. The Church, he felt and said, must take a stand, must define the moral issues and defend man for whom Christ died. Religion observed as a private matter could no longer satisfy a world so caught up in paganism. "However bigoted the announcement may sound," he said, "the Christian can be satisfied with nothing less than a Christian organization of society — which is not the same thing as a society consisting exclusively of devout Christians. It would be a society in which the natural end of man — virtue and well-being in community — is acknowledged for all, and the supernatural end — beatitude — for those who have the eyes to see it." Because we cannot examine the arguments and spirit of this book closely, it is not our business to declare disagreement or agreement: let our reservations or assent await a more careful study, one such as Eliot's honesty compels. We have already seen his approval of Hulme's use of the word "order," but the clearer picture of its implications

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awaits the *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, where culture is to be defined as the incarnation of a religion.

In a world of blatant enthusiasms and politico-religions Eliot declares, "It is not enthusiasm, but dogma, that differentiates a Christian from a pagan society." The maligned word itself is used, but how long will it take men to realize that dogma is not the arbitrary decree of unanswerable Authority, but indeed exists to protect against the arbitrary quality of private fancy or interpretation by placing the final judgment on the meaning of a poetic or dramatic symbol in the hands of the Church itself which is the community, the divinely commissioned community of Christians?

Specifically, what has he to say of the Church? Nothing new: it "exists for the glory of God and the sanctification of souls;" then something very new and as profound a definition of the Church as he is ever to utter:

The Church is not merely for the elect — in other words, those whose temperament brings them to that belief and that behaviour. Nor does it allow us to be Christian in some social relations and non-Christian in others. It wants everybody and it wants each individual as a whole. It therefore must struggle for a condition of society which will give the maximum of opportunity for us to lead wholly Christian lives, and the maximum of opportunity for others to become Christians. It maintains the paradox that while we are each responsible for our own souls, we are all responsible for all other souls, who are, like us, on their way to a future state of heaven or hell. And — another paradox — as the Christian attitude towards peace, happiness and well-being of peoples is that they are a means and not an end in themselves, Christians are more deeply committed to realizing these ideals than are those who regard them as ends in themselves.

Eliot as a sociological thinker has a status that must one day be accorded, however grudgingly. It is brilliant, hard, and passionate, his work — but that is to pay it the highest compliment of seriousness.

One final observation is to our purpose today. Eliot in *The Idea of a Christian Society* quotes Professor Wilhelm Hauer's 1937 contribution to a volume published in England and called *Germany's New Religion*. After much that is shocking and silly, Hauer concludes, "We believe that God has laid a great task on our nation, and that he has therefore revealed himself specifically in its history and will continue to do so." To this preposterous nonsense, Eliot has this rejoinder: "To my ear, such phrases have a not altogether unfamiliar ring. Hauer believes also in something very popular in this country, the religion of the blue sky, the grass and flowers. He believes that Jesus (even if he was wholly Semitic on both sides) is one of the 'great figures who soar above the centuries'." Eliot concludes shrewdly that this is the thinking of a nationalistic Unitarian, "the end product of German Liberal Protestantism."

This brings us naturally to the question of Eliot's position relative to Protestantism. Typically, in 1934 in *After Strange Gods*, Eliot spoke of "the decay of Protestantism"; but six years earlier in *For Lancelot Andrewes*, he referred to humanism as "in fact, a product — a by-product — of Protestant theology in its last agonies." But in his essay on Machiavelli he attacks Calvin directly as the promulgator of a view of man which he considers "far more extreme, and certainly more false" than Machiavelli's; he goes on, you can recall, to label Rousseau's views the inevitable reaction engendered by Calvinism. Eliot calls the Protestant a member of a sect: he is negative and does not have the support of the visible Church with its continuity and inclusiveness. We shall see in a few moments that there is a more central distinction yet, one concerning the Protestant ethos, which renders Eliot unsympathetic though understanding.

A timely word might be said at this point concerning churchmanship. Eliot is well aware that any religion not "renewed and refreshed by an awakening of feeling and fresh devotion, or by the critical reason" is "in danger of petrification into mere ritual and habit, though," he adds, "ritual and habit be essential to religion." He makes clearest his own position in commenting on High Churchmanship in the "Arnold and Pater" essay. He differentiates between the liturgical and ceremonious High Churchmanship of Pater, the Tractarians' passion for "dogmatic essentials," and the High Church "priest working in a slum parish." He refers to the content of "Marius the Epicurean" as reflecting Pater's "prolonged flirtation with the liturgy." This is not unkind but the result of Eliot's agreement that the sensuous, liturgical elements are the very ones that many religions have in common; the conception of Love taught by and embodied in Our Lord — that is the unique value of Christianity. Again, in the Anglican provision, Eliot puts the essentials first and recognizes the principle of freedom in the ordering of the means to the required end. Between Low Churchmen and High Churchmen of integrity there can be no quarrel; the irresponsibles of both preferences are they who elevate usage to the rank of content.

A brief note on the fourth document that concerns us, Eliot's British Broadcasting Corporation talk, "Towards A Christian Britain," given in 1941. Its significance lies in the appreciation it shows and invites for the Christian life lived in humility. The entire talk arises out of the impression made upon him by Rene Bazin's book on Charles de Foucauld. The book exhibits a modern Christian of purest devotion, whose very habit was a sermon, who slept in his hand-built chapel "like a dog at his master's feet," and who met an unsought but triumphant death in the African desert. The holiness which made this achievement possible leads Eliot to reflect on the three aspects of Christian duty: duty to God, chiefly expressed in worship; duty to one's neighbor, articulated in the fight for social justice; duty to oneself in the cultivation of moral and spiritual virtue. Not one of these duties can be properly discharged if either of the other two is neglected. Emphasis upon the de-

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velopment of the individual from day to day must replace the mistaken idea that a Christian life is static, a set of standards imposed in youth and preserved moribund (or under the limitations of childish understanding) throughout life. Progress and unforeseen development are the signs of a healthy spiritual awareness. Therefore to speak of a more Christian Britain is to speak of each individual as becoming more Christian. This will mean sacrifice of present limited personal desires, and the result will be to attain goals which do not now seem desirable. We shall have to make perfect our wills. This is quite different from accomplishing ends whose value we already acknowledge. Eliot's own work illustrates his determination "to *live* the Christian life." This he attempts to do as poet, literary critic, religious pamphleteer, social critic, preface writer, speaker, publisher, and editor. Because he believes the Church is a specially ordained meeting ground of the Divine and His creature, Eliot is warden of his own parish. But his activity is not necessarily public: he is concerned with what he calls "the life of prayer in this world" and in "The Value and Use of Cathedrals in England Today," he affirms that "contemplation . . . is the highest form of human activity." Eliot is aware not only of the First Coming but of the Second. Thus he has interested himself in the problem of education, and stated unequivocally at the Malvern Conference in 1941: ". . . my programme would not include the handing over of educational control to the State. The task of the Church is to christianize the State and society, not to take over any of the functions either of the State or of private groups or foundations."

"Reunion by Destruction" was written in 1943, and we turn to it now not to study its reservations about the plan for Church Union in South India, but because it contains so arresting a picture of the Church of England. The word "church" is defined by dividing it into two differing meanings, the "visible" and the "invisible" Church: the former has been apparent since its foundation by Christ and rejoices in its continuity; the latter has a membership of true believers who cannot be identified by any "outward sign or profession." Now it is possible to retain both these conditions under the aspect of a single Church, but those who think of the invisible Church exclusively in terms of the definition, "tend to think," says Eliot, "of the invisible churches rather as societies or associations, of a voluntary nature, which a man may join or leave at will. But for those to whom the first meaning is paramount, the Church is something which lives: as a tree may be encumbered by parasites, warped and mutilated by tempest, crippled by disease, so the Church lives, sustained by the Holy Ghost, Who causes the sap to flow through its living limbs. Like every other living thing it is something more than and different from the sum of its members." Herein lies the heart of Eliot's disagreement with the Protestant ethos. In practice many communicants of the Church of England are vague about its nature and most interested in it at its parish level. "Nevertheless," Eliot adds — and I think they would recognize themselves in his description —

They are imbued with a spirit which they cannot define which makes them equally uncomfortable in a Roman church or in a dissenting chapel; they

are equally suspicious of the over-precise and of the vague. Strong in practical conscience, they are inclined to distrust the practice of the contemplative life; yet, with an obscure sense of spiritual values, they are dissatisfied with those accredited professors of spiritual knowledge who substitute good works for faith, and who insist upon social activity to the neglect of individual perfection. However indifferent to intellectual formulation, however unaccustomed to analyse their own feelings, they yet recognize themselves as members of a church and not of a religious society. They do not wish to be punctiliously exclusive, but they do not wish to demolish every barrier; to be further set apart from the rest of their nation, or to lose their identity in a mass movement of licentious oecumenicity.

I have quoted this at some length because it so accurately presents at the parish level the tension between the Catholic and Protestant elements in the Christian faith which is the earmark of the Church of England, a Church dear to "the souls of those who are not extreme." Also I should hope that it would remove any suspicion from your minds that what Eliot is devoted to is a church of the past, antique, remote, and aesthetically satisfying. The pamphlet from which we have just quoted was written out of grave concern and had as its purpose the persuasion of his fellow churchmen on an issue of great current and future import. By nature Eliot is incapable of sentimentality of any kind, and he has never been sympathetic with those who would conserve mere tradition. Not to recognize this can only be the result of doing him the injustice of an imperfect reading.

The last of the sources that can be glanced at today is the scarce and never reprinted sermon — though Eliot confessed to finding that formal nomenclature embarrassing — preached in Magdalene College Chapel, Cambridge, at Mid-Lent 1948. It is of prime significance as being a more personal utterance than the others. In it he speaks of his own conversion to Christianity — accomplished in 1927 — and describes it as primarily a negative process: he pursued scepticism to its final statement, and he regarded the futility of non-Christian lives, including his own. In regard to calling one a Christian, he points out the necessity of a person's belonging to a particular communion or sect, for if one says it makes no difference which branch or subdivision one belongs to, it is only a step more to claim that it is not necessary to belong to any — and that is to say that one is a Christian because one says he is! Eliot then goes a step further himself and defines a Christian layman as one who belongs to and actively and joyfully participates in a particular congregation. Here we can see his gratitude to the Church as both the preserver of the Faith and the guide of men's souls. In the thought and lives of Christians, penitence and humility will play a central and saving part. The Sacrifice of the Altar will be the pivot of their days. The discipline required not to be converted to the world will make life, "if not exactly dangerous," he says, "at least disadvantageous; and it is sometimes harder to endure disadvantage than to face danger, harder to live meanly than to die

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as a martyr." And the Church will protect us too from the snares of pride:

... I do not go out to an early communion on a cold morning in order to convert my housekeeper, or to set a good example to the night porter of my block of flats before he goes off duty. If this was my motive, I had better not, for my own sake, go at all; and if the housekeeper and the porter suspected that this was my motive, they would — far from being softened — merely be justifiably irritated by my trying to interfere with their lives.

We have not had the presumption to speak of Eliot the man except as he reveals himself when he creates. To speak of his virtues is not our task, but to profit from them we have only to ponder his words and indeed — in the case of some — to meditate upon them.

If we seek to exhaust our subject we must study *Catholicity*, that Report presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1947, the result of formal conversations between fourteen leading Anglicans of the "Catholic" school of thought in the Church, of which Mr. Eliot was the only lay member. We must study and experience the poems, and we must pay more careful attention to the plays than they have hitherto received. It seems to me for example, and I will not here defend my thesis, that Eliot's idea of the Church is central to the four plays. "Murder in the Cathedral" deals not only with the relation between Church and State but also, and more centrally, discloses the manner in which the Church moulds Thomas into an acceptable servant of God, preserving him from the fatal vanity of those who heed the Fourth — or Unexpected — Tempter. The Church will be "supreme, so long as men will die for it," and Thomas can finally say with justification,

It is not I, Becket from Cheapside,/ It is not against me, Becket, that you strive./ It is not Becket who pronounces doom,/ But the Law of Christ's Church.

That Church the doors of which must be unbarred.

Agatha in "The Family Reunion" is recognized as having "some spell/ that works from generation to generation." Harry acknowledges, "What I want to know is something I need to know,/ And only you can tell me. I know that much." In one dimension of the play's meaning, she, as the Church, the guide, the repository of Truth, is to say the crucial word to the tormented Harry, who seeks his salvation. But one must wait upon God: the Church is no dictatorial sayer. The Holy Spirit uses Agatha: She says, "Do you think that I would take the responsibility / Of tempting them over the border?" Harry will go further than she, for only an individual can achieve salvation. In "The Cocktail Party" Reilly and his assistants are in the same limited but indispensable position. Julia says: "And we know where she is going. / But what do we know of the terrors of the journey? You and I don't know the process by which the human is / Transhumanised." And when Reilly

complains: "And when I say to one like her, / 'Work out your salvation with diligence,' I do not understand / What I myself am saying," Julia replies, "You must accept your limitations." Like Heracles, Reilly achieves but the triumph resides in a power greater than his. Not only the person whose life has a religious calling is dealt with in this play, but Edward and Lavinia and Peter's lives as well, an important movement in Eliot's development. It bears its fruit in "The Confidential Clerk," his complex, deft, and moving — his finest play. All of its characters are treated with a compassion new in Eliot, and the Creator of Life Himself moves through it to bring all men to Himself. Those who are humanly "strong" and those who are humanly "weak" are all seen as weak. Only Eggerson, who has submitted to That which is in but also beyond this world, and Colby, who in revolt moves restlessly through discoveries of "hints and guesses," arrive by the final curtain at "the hint half guessed, the gift half understood" . . . the Incarnation.

I have paused to throw out this thesis so that you might see how central to any appreciation of Eliot's work is a right understanding of his idea of the Church. Now I can infringe upon your time no longer — not, at any rate, with an easy conscience. But, some will say, you have not even mentioned "The Hippopotamus"! Others, I will hope, may consider this a type of blessing.

* * * * *

Summer Schools in Theology and Religion for Episcopal College and University Teachers and Administrators

The Church Society for College Work and the Division of College Work, the National Council, The Protestant Episcopal Church announce that two Summer Schools in Theology and Religion for Episcopal College and University Teachers and Administrators will be held in 1959. The first School will be at the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, from June 23 to July 28, 1959; and the second, made possible through a generous grant to the Church Society from Lilly Endowment, Inc., will be at the Church Divinity School of the Pacific, Berkeley, California, from July 28 to August 30, 1959.

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The Nature of Theological Discourse

Editor's note: *Though one still hears the discharge of an occasional wild shot at the "logical positivists" from a somewhat nervous Christian apologist, isolated at some intellectual outpost, the warfare between the protagonists of what may broadly be called the "analysis of language" on one hand and theologians on the other has shifted its center if it has not actually begun to sound more like the brittle gamesmanship one overhears in the commons room. Even so, or indeed precisely because of this fact, there is much ground to be broken, many new problems hitherto unnoticed to be explored.*

The following discussion clearly shows both the persisting and justified suspicion of the theological discourse and the new willingness, from the point of view of quite divergent philosophical commitments, to accord it a sympathetic analysis.

Such a discussion, tempting as it is to so regard it, is not of interest only to philosophers and to the theologians stung by their barbs. As Bultmann has made clear, the meaning of the kerygma is a matter which has to be made clear within the context of contemporary categories of thought. Therefore, this being essentially a job of concept analysis, it is of concern to the layman as well — not merely the layman as apologist, but even that he may give an adequate account of the faith that is in him.

W.H.P.

God = Worshipped

JASON XENAKIS

Despite appearances to the contrary, " x is a god (a goddess, a deity, divine, etc.)" does not belong to the same series as " x is a person (a woman, a plant, round, etc.)." For to say that x is a god is another way of saying that y worships (fears, adores, etc.) x (whether x 's aspect, on account of which it is worshipped, is real or illusory; we needn't decide whether it is possible for x in its entirety to be illusory, or even incoherent and meaningless). Worshipping is not one thing and divinity another. It is absurd to say that there is a god no one worships, as by contrast it is not absurd to say that there is an organism or a process no one has perceived or even thought about, and of course no one worships; in fact there are plenty of such unperceived or unthought-about things, and discovery would be a meaningless noise if

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that weren't so; on the other hand there is no such thing as discovering a deity. All that can be deduced from the statement that there is a god, assuming for the time being that there is nothing wrong with this kind of language, is that something worships something. "There are gods" means no more than there are worshippers. It doesn't mean the same sort of thing as "there are elephants or Democritean atoms." Nor conversely does "there are no gods" mean the same sort of thing as "there are no centaurs or pink rhinoceroses" but "there are no worshippers" or "no one worships anything." Again worshipping does not serve as evidence of the presence of something by the name of god, as by contrast my seeing a man, or my bumping into something in the dark, serves as evidence of there being a man or something before me. To be divine just is to be worshipped. The two are identical. We've just got two expressions not two things, as is patently not the case with "seeing (touching, etc.) a man" and "a man," let alone with "worshipping (dreading, etc.) a man" and "a man." The truth that " x is a god" can never be false, no matter what x may be, so long as " x is worshipped by y " is true" expresses the interchangeability of two expressions not the interconnection of two things, or the presupposition of one thing or fact by another.

It is no less vacuous to say that we worship gods than to say that we like (desire, pursue, sanction, order, detest, etc.) value (goodness, loveliness, glamor, sublimity, divinity, rightness, justice, ugliness, etc.). A god is what we worship, just as value is what we like. And what we worship are men, cows, weather-phenomena, and so forth, not *gods*; just as what we like are things, actions, experiences and so forth, not *value*. Nor do we worship (venerate, love, etc.) objects *because* they are holy any more than we are in demand *because* we are important. We worship objects because they are, say, virile, just as we are in demand because we are, say, the only cobblers in the area.

And if it is vacuous to say that we worship gods, it is absurd to say that we cognize them. Having a god is neither perceiving nor conceiving (though it may presuppose perceiving or conceiving) but fearing, revering, etc. — in one convenient word, emoting. The talk, like its contrary, of knowing, believing in, searching for, discovering, understanding, trusting, proving the existence of, etc., gods, like the talk of worshipping (admiring, etc.) gods (beauty, etc.), is simply an outcome of mistaking emoting for cognizing; or if you will, it rests on or feeds the illusion that "god" is an object-word, only perhaps that the object it is supposed to denote is an ethereal kind of object. And the same is true of such expressions as "believer," "unbeliever," "a false god" (cf. "a false — unreal — good"), "experience of the divine or of god" (cf. "experience of value") "religious knowledge" (cf. "knowledge — science — of value"), "godless," "blasphemous," etc., as well as of religious prejudice or "god" - monopoly.

You don't know, discover, or search for gods, nor do you prove their existence, any more than you look for, unearth, or establish the reality of heroes and values.

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Nor can you be mistaken about being "godly," any more than an American teenager can be mistaken about getting a thrill out of watching Presley perform. To speak of proving, let alone disproving, the existence of gods, i.e. of one's gods, is twice as absurd as saying that I enjoy Bach's music but nevertheless I must prove to myself that I do. For one thing, you don't *prove* that you have a god any more than you prove that you have an emotion: you just "have" him or you don't. For another, gods, like emotional responses, don't exist: they are, again, "had." And that is why also they are not "known," "discovered," "sought for," and the rest: I mean, that is the way to talk it, that is, we are going to talk "god"-talk at all. The *objects-we-worship* may "exist"; but gods are "had." And flowing from this, they are always by definition *one's* gods — "mine," "yours," "his," "hers," "ours," "theirs" — never just "gods."

Those who speak of the existence or "there-iness" or even of the non-existence or "there-Isn'tness" of gods quite clearly construe "god" as an object-word, usually as a substance-word. But surely, if someone "had a god" and cared to signalize this, he would be speaking absurdly if he were to say "there is a god" or even "there is a god here," let alone "there is god" or, the impropriety *par excellence*, "god (God) exists." Yet if "god" were an object-word there shouldn't be any absurdity in saying at least "there is a god here," as by contrast there isn't any when some object-word or unobjectionable object-word occurs where "god" does. Thus "there is a mouse here" is and sounds perfectly all right. To say what the theist, monotheist, polytheist, pantheist, atheist, and agnostic do is as ludicrous as saying: "Hero exists," "only one hero exists," "more than one hero exists," "everything, or the whole thing, is a hero," "Hero does not exist," "Hero may or again may not exist." And the so-called "proofs of the existence of God" (i.e. of a being that created the universe, etc., etc., assuming for the fun of it that all this makes sense or is coherent) are at least as absurd or pointless enterprises as first mistaking "hero" for a zoological word and then trying to "prove" that there exists, somehow, somewhere (or everywhere), an animal answering this bogus description. Speaking of our Heavenly Father, let me suggest that He could be the product of (1) abstracting the real or imputed qualities and powers, on account of which we worship the things we do, from their possessors or putative possessors, of (2) perhaps idealizing and improving on these abstracted qualities and powers, and of (3) turning the result into a self-subsistent entity. No wonder our Heavenly Father is scientifically elusive — "immaterial."

Now, just as we don't cognize gods, so we don't create, invent, or make them, either — "deify" — any more than we create, invent, or make heroes and values — "beautify." We create works of art, invent gadgets, make tables, but not gods; just as we "confer" degrees, but not holiness, not even value. We just emote — and we don't even emote *them*.

Evidently the systematic, pervasive, and deep-seated confusion of emoting with cognizing, which is ultimately responsible for the previously criticized linguistic or

conceptual habits, is also responsible for the fact that "god"-language is the kind of language it is — an object—, i.e., a pseudo-object-language; which perhaps is another way of saying, what may quite likely be so anyhow, that the confusion is responsible for the language's very existence. In other words, not only "god"-language is redundant since it reduces to psychological language. It is also improper if not misleading as well. And it is improper for *at least* the following specific reasons: because of the proper noun use of "god" and all that goes with this; and because one is allowed to employ the word, whether as a proper or common noun, or some adjectival variant of it without the possessive pronoun or, better, without mentioning or bringing in the worshipper — the other, indeed the crucial, term of the relational situation called having-a-god. This is depicting what in fact is a relational (affective) situation as an absolute (whether substantive or attributive) situation. Or better perhaps, having-a-god becomes assimilated to being-a-man or being-shaped (hence also the designation "being-a-god" which incidentally finds its kin in "being-valuable"); instead of being assimilated to — because identical with — fearing, loving, etc., or being-afraid-of, being-in-love-with, etc. The corresponding syntactical forms are as follows: "*x* is a god (divine)," "*x* is god (God)," "god (God) is *F*," in the fashion of "*x* is a man (round)," "the Evening Star is the Morning Star," "man (Ann) is two-legged." (Needless to say, when the non-"God" term in the identifying-form is a general word, as e.g. in "God is love," there is an extra impropriety.) Less incorrect constructions are: "*x* is a god to (divine for) *y*," "*x* is *y*'s god," "*y*'s god is *x* (or *F*)," where the expression (pronoun, proper name, etc.) filling the *y*-blank stands for a worshipper or group of worshippers.

It may be noted that the cognate language of "value" ("good," "gorgeous," etc.) and of such terms as "hero," "villain," "martyr," "popular," "notorious," "glorious," etc., has similar feature — or defects — if not origins as well, though of course "god"-language comes on top, or rather the whole "religious" or "peculiarly religious" language comes on top. For indeed what I have said about "god"-language can readily be seen to apply *mutatis mutandis* to what is left of the "religious" vocabulary as well, *viz.* "demigod," "idol," "angel," "devil," "hell," "paradise," etc. And I am not referring only to grammatical features; but at least also to what can be expressed by saying that these too like "god" are not really the names of any individuals, species, qualities, agencies, or places, but at best affective or crypto-affective expressions. That is why anybody or any place can be, quite literally, a devil or hell for example, provided that someone intensely dislikes that person or place or suffers on account of him or in it.

It is strange, by the way, that at least philosophers, who have done and are doing such huge work on value-language, have failed to notice that religious words are brother-value-words, or better, that what they call "value-words" includes what I have called for convenience "religious" (or "peculiarly religious") words. There is also the fact that neither Ethical Naturalism nor Emotivism nor Ordinary-Language Ethical Analysis seems to notice that the so-called value-words have a

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mistake built into them, the same kind of mistake I have ascribed to religious words (cf. the revisable *Philosophical Studies* article for April 1954). So that these positions' accounts, if any, of the so-called ethical disputes are likewise in need of repair. For contrary to Emotivism anyway, these "disputes" are not merely, if at all (for the "disputants"), differences in taste, cross-purposes, and the like; and the reason they are pseudo-disputes is that they stem from a misapprehension — that the "disputants" are deluded in thinking that they are *talking-about* (anything), as against expressing preferences, commitments, and in general doing that sort of thing. Nor is it quite true to say that the distinguishing, let alone sole, feature of value-words is their so-called "emotive" (or "normative" or "commendatory/condemnatory") aspect. Indeed, unquestionable object words, like e.g. four-letter words, function much more in that way (or ways) than all the value-words (or negative value-words) put together. The fact is, "emotiveness" and the rest permeate language; and this is natural, since emotion and the like permeate our lives. It is nearer the mark to say that the distinguishing feature of value-words — and that includes now religious words — is that they embody a confusion or at least that they are psychological expressions in disguise (though no doubt some innocuous and perhaps also non-psychological, derivative uses have come about). Moreover there is mystification or reification — or transcription of mystification or reification — in the positions under discussion too and not only in Ethical Intuitionism. There is, e.g., the talk of "worthy of . . ." and of "good reasons," which plainly is as much in need of clarification as the talk it is supposed to clarify — indeed as circular and unenlightening as the supposedly *passee* attempts at "defining" right in terms of good or vice versa. Then there is the (I had hoped antiquated) idea that value-language—or even religious language—is somehow "autonomous," has its "own logic," that the "ought" is "irreducible" to the "is," and so on. However what is needed here, as in the analysis of "religion," is rather the lingo of "heteronomy," reducibility, exposal, and "illogic."

A few words before I conclude about the bearing of this discussion on theology and religion. The former of course turns out to be a misnomer — a name without a subject. The so-called religious experience, if this term is to mean anything, is not a cognitive, let alone a peculiarly cognitive, but an emotional experience; and, needless to add, there is nothing peculiar — "religious" — about, say, being scared about something, save perhaps when that something is illusory. Nor of course are there any such things as religious objects any more than there could be any such thing as a map of religious locations or a spectrum of value. All there is is what psychologists or, if you like, social scientists investigate, plus no doubt confusions and redundant or improper or misleading language, which can be handled by the kind of thinking going on in this paper, in conjunction perhaps with a little psychotherapy. True, social scientists, like legal and historical theorists, psychoanalysts, and others of that category, do resort to value-language; but they needn't nor should do so. Surely economists, for one, can manage perfectly well with the terminology of "price" and the straightforward psychological terminology of "need," "desire," etc. Also the

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pitfalls Karl Marx among others fell into by using value-language should serve as a deterrent to the social scientist's employing that language. But to return to theology. A theologian could be described as a brother-philosopher of the Ethical Non-Naturalism — or of the Autonomy of Morality — brand, only of course much wealthier than him. Let us say not that he (or even his brother) is a maker but rather a transcriber, sustainer, perpetrator, and refiner if not indeed a victim.

Belonging to a religion is essentially one or two or all three of the following things: First, subscribing to a body of beliefs. Now obviously this does not occur only in religion. What is more, religion is not, anyhow at present, the suitable place for it to occur. Surely only science can have a responsible say on what we are to believe about human or non-human nature or even therefore on how we are to go about doing what we ought — in the last analysis want — to do. We have seen furthermore that "religious knowledge" is the child of a confusion and that "religious experience" is at best a term for an emotional not a cognitive sort of experience. And this takes care also of religious so-called disputes. Indeed for the most part these are value-disputes. Secondly, to belong to a religion is to endorse a set of injunctions of how to behave and what to countenance and promote. This too however is quite clearly not a monopoly of religion. And the same holds good of the third and last element, namely worshipping something. In fact, at least today and among so-called civilized people, this phenomenon is more common or even genuine outside than inside religion. Thus avowed Christians worship — though doubtless without generally the ritualistic paraphernalia of organized religion — political leaders, athletes, movie-stars, crooners, or whatnot, rather than Christ (to say nothing of his Heavenly Father). Putting it mildly then, religion fulfills no peculiar function. And that is not all that could be said about it. One could also say, for instance, that as soon as people learn the lesson that to have a god is no more than to undergo an emotional experience — and a very unextraordinary one at that — the institution of the Church will cease to exist.

Comments

I

As explained by Mr. Xenakis, the statement " x is a god" derives its meaning from one particular human situation, namely, the relation between a man and whatever he does actually worship. Given the indefinite usage, "a god," this statement is compatible with others made whether by the same individual or by others, in which they may specify that y and z are also gods in the sense of being entertained in a worshipful way. Clearly monotheists do not accept " x is a god" as a prototypal statement, and the reason may not be due simply to a bungling of the language. It is not that they challenge the use of x in favor of y , z , or some other component in the relation of worshipping, but rather that they remain irritatingly aware of the common discrepancy between what one actually does worship and what one ought to worship. The meaning and even the truth of any particular descriptive statement need not regulate the meaning and truth of the normative statement about the structure of human worship. The position taken here is that the normative statement is neither self-founded nor based upon a description of a worshipful emotion but is regulated by an inferential knowledge of God.

The clash of viewpoints is manifest in regard to this typical monotheistic statement in the negative form: " x , y , and z are false gods or idols and therefore ought not to be worshipped." When the meaning of "god" is taken solely from the description of worshipping, there can be no meaning for "false gods" or "idols." A meaning does appear however as soon as some ground is found for distinguishing between what is actually being worshipped and what should be worshipped. There is question neither about the actual lavishing of worship upon x nor upon our human capacity for including y and z within the sphere of the worshipped. Indeed the use of the terms "false gods" and "idols" supposes that human worship is actually inclusive of these components or at least that there is present the steady intent to include them. Yet the point of the monotheistic criticism is that our actual behavior in worshipful ways does not decide the normative problem and hence does not provide the desired definition of "God." The description of worship does not take account of all the relevant factors or the order between them in determining a theistic meaning for "God."

Within the human matrix of conflict over how the act of worshipping should be reserved and specified in respect to the components other than the worshipper, one relevant factor is the real existence of these other components. Some people identify worshipping with aspiring toward an ideal goal not yet in being, whereas others identify it with reverencing some actual entity which exists or comes to be through man's productive activity. To the monotheist however neither of these views is sufficiently determinate to provide guidance about what men ought to worship. The boundless choice among aspirational ideals and reverable existents indicates that no normative lead to the meaning of "God" can be derived solely from

the worshipful attitude of a man toward some ideal or actual reference. The reverent feeling which an individual may have toward the sun, the power of lightning, the national spirit, or some other locus of value does not warrant restricting the meaning of "God" to "that which is held in worship." When the individual is faced with clashing claims to his worship, he cannot simply reiterate the private fact of his worshipping but must look to evidence in experienced things bearing upon the being to which human worship is due, not simply given. In being forced to revise and critically discriminate concerning various terms in the relation of worship, he is faced with a speculative problem which involves more than the use of language to describe factual human behavior.

The monotheistic approach places a peculiar stress upon the question of the real existence of God as the creative cause and goal of all finite things. When viewed as an obligation and not simply as a fact, worship is not self validating and self-designative of the meaning of "God." The act of worshipping is a human response to a definite situation. It is our practical way of acknowledging a condition in being, that is, a real bond holding between the finite existent and the existing, causal source of its actuality. Worship is a response to a truth known to hold good for the existent world. However one may come by the knowledge (and this lies outside the present discussion), the truth of the statement, "that being exists which is the cause of finite things and is itself uncaused and really distinct from all finite things," remains decisive for the theistic conception of worship. When it is further explicated, it provides an independent basis for regarding worship as a duty as well as a fact and also for specifying the proper referent in due worship. The term "God" is never rightly used in a theistic philosophy outside the context of some such existential-causal proposition and the inference upon which its validity is founded. Similarly the statement "God exists" is intended as a concentrated expression of the complex proposition whose truth is determined through some sort of casual inference from the experienced world. The present inquiry does not concern the validity of this reasoning but only its relevance for understanding the theistic usage of "God."

The linguistic difficulties based upon the supposition that theists employ "God" as an object-word overlook the influence of the judgmental and inferential context within which the term is used in philosophical work. "God" is not taken as designating a kind of substance or essential nature for which one then tries to find a specimen. The term is used existentially at the outcome of a casual inference establishing the unique actuality of the existent, first cause of finite existents, and its real distinction from them. To give the name "God" to the being whose existence is known in this way is not the same as to posit "hero" and then search for its existence. Nor is it a quixotic mistaking of what is for what one has, provided that one does not circularly reduce the existential truth about God to the attitudes we have. This reduction cannot be made if we ground our statements about God upon the causal inference to the uncaused existent rather than stipulate them to be only descriptions

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of human feelings. In the former case there is then made available a rigorous meaning for the statement "the true God exists and He alone is to be worshipped." A study of the language and psychology of worship is helpful but ultimately indecisive for determining the meaning of "God" in its theistic usage since such a study precinds from the precise kind of inference which controls the meaning of the term.

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II

In his article Mr. Jason Xenakis begins by saying, "Despite appearances to the contrary, 'x is a god (a goddess, a deity, divine, etc.)' does not belong to the same series as 'x is a person (a woman, a plant, round, etc.)'." He adds, "For to say that x is a god is another way of saying that y worships (fears, adores, etc.) x. . . ."

People have said that Christ was divine. Was this another way of saying of others, or of themselves, that they worship Christ?

This question seems hardly worth asking because it is so very easy to recall that one who defends or questions the statement, "Christ is (was) divine," proceeds very differently from one who defends or questions a statement as to how he (or others) feels towards Christ.

The procedure of one who defends the statement, "Christ is (was) divine," is not unlike that of one who defends the statement that a certain feeling of adoration or worship would be *appropriate* towards Christ. But then the procedure of one who defends the statement that a certain feeling is or would have been appropriate towards a certain person or thing is very different from that of one who defends a statement to the effect that a certain feeling is, was, or would have been felt towards that thing. Sometimes when one has laughed at someone or something one is asked, "Why laugh?" The defense of one's laughter or amusement is remarkably like the defense of the statement that what one laughed at was laughable or amusing. But then the defense of one's laughter or amusement is very different from the defense of the statement that one laughed or was amused.

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III

Mr. Xenakis' essay is deficient on two accounts: (1) its internal logic: that is, it makes mistakes in its own terms; (2) it is not supported by the right fundamental hunches, such that its weakness is not simply the failure to do justice in an explicit statement to a position which is fundamentally correct. The case is worse than that.

Let me make the internal criticism first. The main point of the essay is that "God" is not a descriptive or object term. It is rather a word people emotive with, where the emoting is worshipping. This position can be given a fairly consistent defense *a la* Stevenson, but Xenakis' argument is riddled with inconsistencies, though he associates it with emotivism. (a) He confuses emotivism with psychologism especially towards the end of this statement, claiming that religious expressions can be reduced to psychological statements, which leaves the religious utterances "redundant" — there is *no* use for them, not even the emotive function, in the enlightened field of experience and expression. Such a position is certainly *not* emotivism, despite this essay's declarations in that direction. Indeed it contradicts the earlier notion that "God" is not a descriptive or object word. If "there are gods" means no more or less than "there are worshippers," the theological expression is a factual (and true) statement.

(b) Having connected the emotive with the non-cognitive, Xenakis makes the mistake of identifying both with the "relational." His argument here is the old one that you cannot conceive such things as, say, heroes or fathers all by themselves in the universe without relation to hero-worshippers and children. This is trivially true. But does this entail that "there are fathers" *means* "there are children," and that only the children can significantly be said to exist? ("there are gods" means "there are worshippers," and only the worshippers are properly said to exist.) If God is what we worship, which Xenakis asserts in these very words, and if this "is" is definitive or essential, then of course only what we worship will be God. And if, as Xenakis argues, what we worship are such things as cows and weather-phenomena, then these *in that relationship* will be gods; every bit as much as a man is a hero in relation to those who lionize him, or a father in relation to his off-spring. Thinking in these terms, why on earth does Xenakis want to say that "there are gods" means "there are worshippers"? Rather "there are worshippers" should be asserted to mean that there are such things as cows taken to be sacred, which are gods in that relation. And a sacred cow is not a worshipper, but something worshipped. Moreover this way of putting it is more consonant with the very title of the essay "God=Worshipped"; very different from the other proposition which is here also asseverated: "God=Worshipper (Worshipping)." Xenakis should make up his mind about this instead of toying with both propositions as if they were equivalent.

Curiously compounded with these bad arguments is a good point, recognition of which takes a little of the poison out of Xenakis' performance. This noteworthy

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concept is that, when one values something, he is not valuing a value; the *object* of the valuation is the something itself. And Xenakis significantly notices that the word "God" is like the word "value" in this respect: it is not a sort of noun standing for some object, substantial or insubstantial; that is, it does not have an ordinary referring or descriptive use.

But, having achieved this *aperçu*, Xenakis gives the impression of nevertheless arbitrarily making "God" stand for or refer to something in the human subject like emoting, worshipping; or even to the whole subject of the experience as worshipper ("there are Gods" means that there are worshippers). This in effect betrays the *aperçu* by forcing the theological term to denote an object after all on the subjective side of the fence (religious statements are psychological statements).

All of this goes to show that the author has completely missed the contribution of the new language philosophy (stemming from Wittgenstein) in its bearing on the language of morals and valuation (Hare, Toulmin). There too we have the important concept of the non-descriptive and non-statemental use of value-terms such as "good" without however the stultifying confusion with emotivism or with psychologism — the old tendency to treat religious expressions as if their meaning is the venting of emotions or the reference to psychological states. The extension of this new notion to "God" as a non-emotive, non-psychological religious term has not yet adequately been made by anyone. I was disappointed to find in this essay only retrogression to an old and smaller position, a raucous scientism. And the reason for this short-coming reminds me of the second sort of defect I mentioned at the beginning: this essay shows not the slightest symptom of laboring with any new basic alternative or insight too fundamental and fresh to permit of an adequate statement at the first try.

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IV

Mr. Xenakis' attack upon the presuppositions and claims of religion will doubtless carry a strong appeal, as scepticism has repeatedly done, to those who are tired of the cant, the confusions, and the priggishness that are so often associated with religious ways of saying and doing. In an age when Hollywood and TV are finding that religion pays dividends and when jukeboxes belch forth their croonings about the Man Upstairs, it is no wonder that honest men should seize upon drastic remedies. The deflation of blowsy prejudices and attitudinizings may bring relief like that of a pricked boil or the washing of grimy hands. All honor to those who have dared to question the Emperor's clothes or to proclaim like Nietzsche that "God is dead"! (It may be truer to say that God is always dying and always being reborn

— the lesson of the Greek mystery religions if we could but understand them.) So, if there were no more to the story than readily meets the eye, Mr. Xenakis' position would probably be endorsed by all of us who prefer clean air to smog. It is my belief however that the issue at stake is by no means capable of such black-and-white, open-and-shut treatment and that Mr. Xenakis, in avoiding one set of errors, has fallen victim to some errors of an opposite sort which do quite as much to obfuscate and distort the problem he wants to deal with.

Perhaps the basic inadequacy of Mr. Xenakis' method is shown in his assumption (for he asserts it without proof) that the sentence, "There are gods," means *no more than* that there are men who worship. I am always suspicious of any declaration that one type of meaning is no more than, and really nothing else but, some other type of meaning. By the nature of the case such a statement is neither a subjective avowal ("It means no more to *me* than so-and-so") or else, if the writer seeks to impose it upon other people's way of seeing the matter, it is a dogma — i.e., a dogma of methodology — for which no adequate evidence can be given. To be sure, Mr. Xenakis goes on to say quite correctly that the sentence "There are gods" carries a basically different type of meaning from that of such sentences as "There are elephants" and "There are atoms." But it does not follow that the expression "there are" is used altogether invalidly and subjectively in the first of these instances, nor that the possibilities of objective thinking are confined to situations represented by the second and the third. It may be that there are more kinds of validity and objectivity than some of the current theories of semantics are prepared to admit.

When Mr. Xenakis asserts that divinity means no more than the fact that there are worshippers, he is riding a partial insight too hard. I agree that the reality of the divine cannot be judged or significantly meant in entire isolation from the disposition to worship. The concept of "god" (whether singular or plural) is a bare abstraction when it has lost all such connection. But such an acknowledgment does not commit us to the view that "god" means no more than the fact that someone is worshipping. On such an interpretation it would follow that, if all worshippers were to fall asleep or turn to secular concerns simultaneously, for a time no god would exist. Such a notion of existence is logically tenable, and with analogous logic it could be maintained that the other side of the moon and the inside of my desk drawer do not exist at the times when no one is perceiving them. But none of us, I dare say, seriously and consistently thinks of existence in that subjective manner. Physical existence is not sensation but, as John Stuart Mill has put it, the permanent possibility of sensation. Analogously the divine may be roughly defined, not as the momentary fact of somebody's act of worshipping, but as the permanent possibility of significant worship. By this definition it is acknowledged that the existence of God or gods is somehow bound up with the actuality of worshipful experience, but also that the divine existence may nevertheless go on independently of whether there are current acts of worship or not. This after all is a natural and usual way of thinking. For evidence always points beyond itself; it is always evidence *of*. Different

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emphases and focussings of experience come into play according as our interest is in elephants or in atoms or in gods; but in all cases the object meant (i.e., affirmed, questioned, denied, liked or disliked, worshipped, etc.) is something more than the psychological activities that constitute our act of being interested in that object.

It is true of course that a much greater sharpness of focus is possible in the case of physical objects (for most of us, at least) than in the case of theological ones. Hence there arise serious difficulties in the making of sound theological judgments such as are not ordinarily present in the making of judgments about visible things like elephants or about scientific objects like atoms. In other words it is harder to avoid nonsense when talking about God or gods than when talking about elephants or atoms. This may be a good reason for giving silence a more effective place in one's religious outlook, but I cannot see that it affords any logical basis for supposing that all religious judgments are illusory.

The same question can be seen in slightly different perspective, and Mr. Xenakis does so consider it, by examining the relation of the terms *knowledge* and *emotion* — or, perhaps more exactly, *cognitive* and *emotive*. Here too I would warn against the temptation to rigidify the distinction. It is true that there are cases of almost pure cognition ("Here is an elephant," "This route is shorter than that one," etc.), and contrariwise that there are cases where an emotion impedes one's ability to judge the facts. No one doubts that both these types of situation exist. But it seems to me that nearly all the more interesting, more human, and more educative instances tend to by-pass the distinction between cognitive and emotive, employing rather an admixture of both. In considering questions that deeply engage us we do not quash and rule out our emotions entirely (we delude ourselves if we think we do); we proceed rather by maturing our emotions, refining and steadying them, and endeavoring to make them not obstructions but channels.

There is still a legitimate sense in which Mr. Xenakis can continue to hold his position. He can declare, as a working principle, that all theological terms are meaningless *for him* and that he intends to limit his investigations and discussions to what *he considers* meaningful; for the sentence "there is a mouse," he tells us, "is, and sounds, perfectly all right." But let us all avoid the fallacy — the *odolum theatri*, if we may extend Bacon's use of the term — of presuming that any single semantic perspective is to be the final criterion of what can be significantly thought, uttered, and believed in.

PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT
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University of California at Riverside

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR



IT IS WRITTEN IN A NARRATIVE RATHER THAN INTROSPECTIVE STYLE WHICH MAY PERHAPS MAKE FOR QUICKER READING BUT LEAVES SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED ON THE LEVEL OF CHARACTER MOTIVATION



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BUT THESE ARE MINOR CRITICISMS. ONE CAN NOT DENY THE POWER AND SWEEPING RANGE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER - (ONE MIGHT EVEN CALL IT EPIC) -



- THE SOBTLE ALLEGORICAL NUANCES TOUCHED, AT TIMES, WITH WHAT SEEMS TO BE AN ALMOST METAPHYSICAL INSIGHT! IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE CONTROVERSY IN THE LITERARY FIELD.



BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

BUT THE AUTHORS,
WHILE WRITING IN A
QUASI-JOURNALISTIC
FORM SHOW OCCASIONAL
FLOURISHES OF
STYLISTIC DARING
WHICH MAKES ONE
IMPATIENT TO
VIEW THEIR LATER
EFFORTS



I SHALL
AWAIT
THEIR
SECOND
BOOK
WITH
GREAT
INTEREST.



Reproduced by the kind permission of the artist, Jules Feiffer, *The Village Voice*, and the Association Press. This cartoon appeared originally in *The Village Voice*, where Mr. Feiffer's cartoons are published weekly. Sooner or later you are sure to see the artist's book, *Sick, Sick, Sick* (McGraw-Hill, 1958), which he heartily recommend.

The Paradoxes of Democracy

By Kermit Eby and June Greenleaf. New York: Association Press, 1956. 219 pages, \$3.50.

This is a probing book, a thought provoking challenge to all who would understand the complexity and the self-contradictions within American political and economic life. Kermit Eby and his associate June Greenleaf give a penetrating analysis of the paradoxical contradictions in American democratic life. For the most part these contradictions are located in the conflict between our espoused ideals and the facts of political and economic life. We claim to stand for freedom and individualism but more and more we force conformity. We claim persons are more important than machines, but more and more we organize life for ends which make machines more important than men. In theory we stand for government by law under which it would be possible to enforce openness to freedom, but we settle for government by men who evade the controls which the law develops for guaranteeing equal protection and equal freedom. We avow that men should govern themselves, that majority rule and individual responsibility should be the source of our law, but in practice we fear such freedom and prefer authority. We prefer to be told. We allow majority opinion to be represented and formed by pressure groups and lobbies.

Such contradictions in our national and local life are the paradoxes of democracy. Eby and Greenleaf present these paradoxes and their challenge vividly by weaving together striking quotations, brief historical analyses, and longer illustrations of their themes taken from contemporary American life. Many of the latter are accounts based on Professor Eby's personal experience and observation (the subpoena of Eby by the Jenner committee, Trumbull Park's racial disturbances, Eby's struggle in the Chicago Teacher's Union, the contention over the guaranteed annual wage in the U.A.W.).

The concluding chapter presents the authors' affirmations, again with some highly personal illustration from the life of author Eby. The writers belief that democracy must be undergirded by an ethical and rational idealism. Such idealism must be fulfilled in action:

He has faith in democracy who can continue battling for the fulfillment of his dream, even though harassed by the day-to-day, the small, the needling, disappointments. It takes more courage to stay in and take the buffeting than to withdraw into the island of the like-minded.

He has faith in democracy who knows what he believes, gets a base in organization, and goes to work! (p. 210)

Perry LeFevre

A Review Article

The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology

By Rudolf Bultmann. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, 171 pages, \$3.00.

On the Philosophy of History

By Jacques Maritain. Edited by Joseph W. Evans. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957, 180 pages, \$3.50.

A century ago every theologian worth his salt felt compelled to write a book on Science and Religion before he laid down his pen. Now the book he has to write is one on the Meaning of History. Berdyaev, Brunner, Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and a host of lesser lights have yielded to the urge, and Christian laymen like Arnold Toynbee and Christopher Dawson have contributed less theological interpretations. If one includes periodical material, a mere bibliography of the literature which has appeared since the First World War on the Christian understanding of history would make a sizeable pamphlet. Most of these works are briefer than the *Civitas Dei*, but the circumstances behind their composition are reminiscent of the fifth century: the threat of war, revolution, and social disintegration, the breakdown of an older interpretation of history (*Romanitas* or Progress), and the revival of spiritual insight among a few intellectuals.

The latest to contribute to this literature are Rudolf Bultmann and Jacques Maritain — the one a German, a Protestant, and a theologian — the other a Frenchman, a Catholic, and a philosopher. In 1955 Bultmann chose "History and Eschatology" as the theme of his ten Gifford Lectures (the title added by the American publishers is irrelevant and misleading). In the same year Maritain gave four lectures at Notre Dame "On the Philosophy of History" which were recorded on tape, edited by a faithful disciple, and added to by their author in the light of an article on his interpretation of history by Msgr. Charles Journet (1949).

There are some interesting parallels between the two resulting volumes. Both appear very late in the careers of their authors. Both are brief and sketchy rather than definitive. On the surface both are concerned about the same central problems defined by the past generation's discussion of the subject: providence, judgment, progress, straight-line versus cyclical time, freedom and law in history. Both agree in general that a true sense of the meaning of history is to be found not in Greek thought or in the Western Enlightenment but in the Hebraic-Christian tradition.

There are also striking differences between the two books. Bultmann's approach is theological and Pauline, Maritain's philosophical and Thomist. Bultmann's *bêtes-noires* are Gnosticism and Stoicism in the ancient world, historical relativism and nihilism in the modern. Maritain's *bêtes-noires* are more personal: Hegel, Marx,

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and Comte. Both insist on the reality of man's freedom, but Bultmann follows closely St. Paul's doctrine of grace in solving the problem, while Maritain sticks by the scholastic doctrine of sufficient grace ("God gives a breakable motion or activation toward good"). So far as the problem of evil is concerned, Bultmann is more concerned to avoid a Platonic solution, Maritain more concerned to stay clear of anything savoring of Manichaeism or "Satanocracy." Both appreciate the importance of St. Paul in the development of a Christian understanding of history, both under-rate St. Augustine, but for different reasons.

The big difference between the two authors, which I believe will strike any reader, is that Bultmann is really concerned about the problem of what he calls "the historicity of man," Maritain is not. By "historicity" Bultmann means a conception of man as qualified by his past and responsible for his future. Man is really affected by his "encounters" in history, in fact "it belongs to the historicity of man that he gains his essence in his decisions." To live in responsibility over against the future in the light of the past, this is what "the historicity of the human being" means. "Genuine historicity means to live in responsibility and history is a call to historicity." "Always in your present lies the meaning in history, and you cannot see it as a spectator, but only in your responsible decisions. In every moment slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. You must awaken it."

This conception of man was unknown to Greek thought, Bultmann insists. Its origins lie in Hebraic religion and its full development is the work of Christianity. Bultmann is naturally at his best in analyzing the Biblical conception of man and of freedom, of history and eschatology. At times he makes St. Paul sound like a twentieth-century Existentialist, but no matter. The hand of the master-scholar is evident wherever the biblical and hellenistic sources are in question. Unfortunately the same is not true of the bald and thin summary of the course of Western thought about "historicity" down to the twentieth century. Here Bultmann is embarrassingly dependent on others for his ideas and even his materials — on Erich Frank and Erich Auerbach for ideas, on Löwith's *Meaning in History* for quotations, and on Collingwood for modern conceptions of history. The thesis is sound enough: in different ways the idea of man's "historicity" was lost or misunderstood in scholasticism, in the idea of progress, and in the cult of realism, but recovered in the twentieth century by secular thinkers like Croce, Collingwood, and the Existentialists. The treatment here however is poorly organized, second-hand, and disappointing. One has the feeling that if Bultmann had read Vico, Herder, Marx, and Burckhardt with as much care as his guide, Löwith, this latter part of his Gifford Lectures could have been exciting. As it is, the lectures stand as a sort of half-finished but nonetheless imposing attempt to sculpture a Christian Existentialist theology of history.

Maritain's lectures leave a different kind of impression. They impress me as final proof, if any were needed, that a Thomist is not really interested in the problem of history at all. Maritain is interested in Being, not in Becoming. He begins in good

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Thomist fashion by categorizing philosophy of history as a subordinate branch of moral philosophy — but something above both “history integrally taken” and “merely factual history” in the hierarchy of knowledge. He then devotes most of his space to “Axiomatic Formulas or Functional Laws” and “Typological Formulas or Vectorial Laws” which illuminate but do not determine the historical process. Some of these “laws” are: “that history progresses both in the direction of good and in the direction of evil,” that particular events have world-wide significance, that “humble temporal means” are superior to “rich temporal means, with respect to spiritual ends,” and that “our knowledge of moral laws is progressive in nature.” Some of the typological problems are whether the theological states of nature and grace are of any importance for history, what is the significance of the destiny of the Jewish people, and what is the meaning of passing from “sacral” to “secular” civilizations, from “magical” to “rational” thought, or from authoritarian to democratic rule. The treatment here is sketchy, abstract, and unconvincing. “Formulas,” “laws,” and problems are jumbled together with little sense of discrimination, and almost all illustration is left to the reader’s imagination. The neat patterns of Hegel, Marx, and Comte are vigorously rejected — in favor of a hazy congeries of generalizations, some theological, some philosophical, some more or less empirical. Along the way there are some fine insights and some splendid writing, for instance: “Acceptance of time and of history was a conquest of Christianity and modern times. But this very acceptance would be of a nature to drive man to despair if he could not decipher some transhistorical meaning in the awful advance of time into the night of the unknown, thronged with perpetually new perils.” Also unfortunately some bad writing: “Time is not simply a garbage can in which practical men would have to pick up more or less profitable opportunities.” At the close Maritain tackles Bultmann’s problem of the relation between eschatology and history or, as he puts it, between “God and the Mystery of the World.” With the help of some rather naïve diagrams and of Journet’s work on the Church as the Word Incarnate, he works out the intimate relationships between natural and supernatural ends, the World and the Kingdom.

Part of the problem of reviewing essays on the interpretation of history is that no man is enough of a theologian, philosopher, and historian rolled into one to do the job well. What a theologian or a philosopher would say about these two books, I do not know. I suspect that each might say in different ways that both essays are interesting examples of their authors’ basic positions but not major works. Both authors (particularly Maritain) refer the reader frequently to fuller treatments of special points which they have published previously. Both (especially Maritain) leave the impression that, if the subject had been really crucial in the development of their thought (as it was, for instance, in Reinhold Niebuhr’s), the two books would have been written years ago.

It is Maritain who in his "Final Remarks" raises the question that any historian (like the present writer) must raise, I believe. "The main intention of this book," he writes, "was to stress the possibility, and the validity, of certain philosophical laws . . . *which enlighten human history and make it more intelligible to us*, but which neither explain it nor subject the course of historical events to necessity" (italics mine). He adds disarmingly that this is why he has limited himself to "a number of more or less disconnected instances," emphasizing the modesty of his effort. A fair question: does his essay and Bultmann's — and most of the essays on theology of history which have appeared in the last thirty years — do they really "enlighten human history and make it more intelligible to us"? In other words do they contribute to our understanding of *history*, as well as of theology and philosophy? I am not at all sure that they do. Such enlightenment *has* come to our study and understanding of history in the past. Augustine's conception of the unity and progressive character of history influenced historians for a thousand years. The idea of the integrity and wholeness of civilizations which Vico and Voltaire sketched out became an effective instrument of analysis in the hands of professional historians like Burckhardt. The idea of organic evolution adumbrated by Herder and reinforced in biology by Darwin was of enormous usefulness to nineteenth-century historians. And whatever one thinks of the absurdities of Soviet historiography, there is no denying the fructifying results of Marx's historical insights. Toynbee's ideas — "challenge and response," "withdrawal and return," etc. — are probably not in this class. "All that, I dare say," says Maritain of Toynbee's work, "provides us with rather scanty intellectual food, and teaches us scarcely more than plain common sense could teach us." Historians a hundred years from now, I fancy, will agree with this judgment. But will they also say the same of Maritain himself and of all the Christian theologians of history who wrote so voluminously at mid-century to instruct historians in the meaning of history?

What if Bultmann and Maritain and all the others were as interested in the concrete and baffling realities of the historical process as, say, Augustine was (in spite of the second-rate sources he used)? What if they made a habit of reading as much actual history as they read of theology or philosophy? Would they not be able thus to "enlighten human history" more effectively than they have been able thus far? Historians are admittedly naïve and often obstinately ignorant in matters philosophical and theological. But when a first-rate historian like Herbert Butterfield sets himself seriously to interpret the theme of "Christianity and History" in all its concreteness and confusion and fascination to a wide popular audience — trying to wrestle not only with "divine judgment" in general, for instance, but also with the problem of whether such judgment can be read in the fall of Nazi Germany in particular — he apparently is able to say nothing worthy of a theologian's attention. It seems unfortunate that neither Bultmann nor Maritain feel it important to discuss Butterfield. Maritain regrets that "the pressure of time" does not permit him to discuss "Herbert Butterfield, Isaiah Berlin, Christopher Dawson, and P. A. Sorokin,

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for whom I have special appreciation" (historians or social scientists all). Bultmann is sorry too. "Nor have we time to dispute with H. Butterfield's thought, developed in his book *Christianity and History*. Although I do not think he has clearly seen the problem of historicism and the nature of historicity, his book contains many important statements."

If the tone of this article seems unduly critical — or "gnoseological," as Maritain puts it — it is not because the writer lacks respect for the theologians of history. Rather it is because he regrets that the meaning-of-history literature, much of it of great profundity and importance, is having almost no effect on the historical profession today. Careful study of the two books under review may suggest some reasons why.

E. HARRIS HARBISON

Technics and Purpose

"Science and Existence" by Alan Richardson

"Scientific and Technological Education" by Edwin Barker

"Technical Education: An Appraisal" by H. A. Warren

"Purpose in Teacher Training" by Monica Wingate

(Four booklets sponsored by a Working Party convened by the Education Department of the British Council of Churches) London: SCM Press, 1957. 30 to 38 pages, Two Shillings and Sixpence each.

This group of four thin pamphlets — each of which is about the length of an average book chapter—has as its general purpose the examination of "the issues arising in the growing importance of scientific techniques in our society, and the rapid expansion of technological and other education."

The first booklet sets the background for the entire series by discussing the general relationship between scientific and religious truth. It discusses scientific knowledge in contrast with existential knowledge, the latter being representative of religious understanding. The first is regarded as objective, impersonal, disinterested, abstract, and prosaic; the latter is subjective, personal (in the I-Thou sense), interested, individual, concerned, valuative, and poetic in expression. Scientific language, e.g. says, "All men die;" religious knowledge, because it is existential, says, "I will die."

Mr. Barker is Assistant General Secretary of the National Council of British Y.M.C.A.'s. He has written the most interesting and suggestive of the four discussions. Like Canon Richardson, Barker points out that science is based upon faith in

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the rationality of the universe and has historically arisen in a Christian culture because Christianity takes the world of matter seriously. Barker is aware of the profound changes taking place in science's self-understanding of its truth, changes that arise as realist theories of science are challenged by other analyses. Barker is suspicious of the bogus qualities of courses about science that never train the students to be scientists. He warns against constructing a Christian system on Newtonian idealism when the scientific world has passed beyond it. He suggests that technical education can be infused with Christian meaning — not by adding courses in humanities and the arts to the curriculum, but by understanding science itself in a historical and theological context.

The third discussion is by the Principal of the S. E. London Technical College. It begins with a statistical and factual description of technical education in Britain and Wales. In the second part it moves into a fascinating analysis of "fitness of purpose" (i.e. efficiency) as the sole guiding criterion for what is done in technical education. In a comment on the relation of technical and liberal education the author lays the blame for social conservatism at the doorsteps of the classically rather than the technically educated. This may be a valid generalization for Britain; it is too broad for America.

The fourth booklet deals with teacher training. While the discussion is obviously cast in terms of the British system of the two year training college (to be increased to three years in 1960) there is a great deal of material here of interest to all people interested in teacher training. The argument drives to the heart of some thorny questions in educational psychology and policy. It criticizes the lack of time for reflection and growth, the failure of the teachers' college to provide a genuine community, and the need to have a curriculum that leads the student to an adequate understanding of contemporary culture.

One is a bit disappointed that these treatments are so brief, that they only whet the appetite for further discussion of the problems they raise rather than satisfying the hunger. Perhaps this is well, for they will spur readers to their own thinking about the issues raised and can be used to excellent advantage for discussion guides in groups concerned about these special problems.

Edward L. Long, Jr.

Count Zinzendorf

By John R. Weinlick. New York: Abingdon Press, 1956. \$4.75

This timely book, in addition to being the first biography in English of that rather rare bird, a Protestant Prince of the Church, gives us an important chapter in the history of German Pietism. It is a timely book inasmuch as the church which Count Zinzendorf unwittingly resuscitated (the *Unitas Fratrum*, founded by one branch of the followers of Hus in 1457) celebrates this year its quinqucentennial, making it one of the oldest Protestant churches in existence.

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

That the biography of an evangelical Pietist should simultaneously be the story of a movement is altogether fitting. There may be such a thing as a lone mystic, but never was there a lone Pietist! Pietism is by nature contagious. A real Pietist must needs share his religious experience with others: a pietist of genius, as Zinzendorf undoubtedly was, must needs further a movement or found one. Zinzendorf, the born leader, founded a movement (the Herrnhuters, a historic group of latter day Pietists) and in so doing quite unknowingly was instrumental in renewing an ancient church which had gone completely underground after the Thirty Years' War. In 1727, five years after offering refuge to religious exiles on his Saxonian estate, Zinzendorf came across the history of the *Unitas Fratrum*, written for posterity by Amos Comenius, distinguished educator and last bishop (so he thought) of his persecuted Bohemian Brethren. Only then did the Count become acquainted with the church background of the Moravian refugees he was harboring at Herrnhut. He spent the remainder of his life faithfully guiding the activities of his rapidly growing flock, fervently attempting to prevent them from becoming dissenters and separatists. The very last thing Zinzendorf desired to do was to foster a new denomination. All his life he considered himself a Lutheran and would have had his Herrnhuters remain within the Lutheran fold. It was the Lutheran Church that would not have them. The ultimate result was an ecclesiastical hybrid, so to speak, a world fellowship that is today both a Society like the Friends, and also a denomination. In Germany at the present time, the Herrnhuters are known as the "Brüdergemeine" and it is possible to be one of them and yet to be a member of an established church. In other countries, such as England and the United States, they are known as the Moravian Church.

And what have the Herrnhuter-Brüdergemeine-Moravians contributed to society? The answer makes an impressive list: Within 20 years of their renaissance, the Moravians at Herrnhut were sending their missionaries to the farthest ends of the earth. As a result of Zinzendorf's insistence that they never proselytize but always and only evangelize, theirs was a creative impact upon the whole missionary movement. On American soil they founded numerous Indian missions and a number of cities including Bethlehem, Pennsylvania and (Winston-) Salem, North Carolina. They founded many schools and colleges, some of conspicuous merit. The first nursery school and kindergarten grew out of the necessity to care for the children of their missionaries. Two of their educational institutions begun as seminaries for girls have become colleges for women and still function today. In Europe they also founded notable schools. There, within the established churches, they aroused many to return to "the inwardness of the original Lutheran revolt" and to practice Luther's principle of the priesthood of all believers. This brought new vigor into the religious life of countless thousands. Towns in Germany, Holland, Switzerland and England trace their origin to Moravian settlements. A Leper Asylum in Jerusalem is but one of many lasting monuments to their humanitarian service. They had a decisive influence on John Wesley and through him on the whole Methodist Church.

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For over a century they practiced continuous intercessory prayer and for over two centuries they have been issuing a devotional book each year that is still read daily by Moravians and non-Moravians in many lands and diverse tongues. Through their settlements in Pennsylvania and North Carolina they made a distinct contribution to the cultural life of America. In Europe they exerted no small influence on the literature of the later Romantic Movement.

The aspect of Zinzendorf's activity that Professor Weinlick could hardly have overemphasized was his ecumenical endeavor. His convictions concerning the nature of the Church were far in advance of his day and consequently misunderstood. He was convinced that no church was a steward of more than a fragment of God's Truth; that good Christians are to be found in every denomination; that the unity of the children of God is a fact despite the diversity of creeds and the multiplicity of churches. He believed that the Invisible Church becomes a reality and visible in the eyes of the world through the fellowship of its members. The seven Pennsylvania Synods presided over by Zinzendorf during his second sojourn in the New World (1741-42) constitute the first ecumenical movement on American soil.

Should there not be room within the established churches for a certain amount of "free religion," for "conventicle Christianity," for creative group movements such as the Herrnhuters represented? Time and again in church history such groups of particularly earnest Christians have cropped up, expanding rapidly into a whole network of groups, quickening the religious life of their communities. They are rarely welcomed or even tolerated by the ecclesiastical powers that be, a fact that has so lamentably often led to further fragmentation of the Body of Christ. Established churches are not quick to recognize their own debt to unconventional Christians.

Here, at any rate, was a man who contributed enormously to the life of the Church. How easily he might have led the comfortable life of an aristocrat. Instead, with apostolic zeal, extraordinary organizing ability and tireless energy this "win-some personality" preached, taught, travelled, wrote, composed, fathered 12 children and headed a spiritual family that was world wide and that to this day gratefully reveres his memory.

Elizabeth H. Zorb

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Dr. Edward Leroy Long, Jr. is Associate Professor of Religion at Oberlin College. He has written *The Religious Beliefs of American Scientists* and other books.

Dr. Perry Deyo LeFevre is Assistant Professor of Theology and Education at the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago.

Dr. Elizabeth H. Zorb is Associate Professor of German at Vassar College.

Reports and Notices

Christianity and Law

The first national conference on Christianity and law, Sept. 7-10, brought together for the first time on the national level legal authorities, students, and clergy from 30 states and representing as many different church communions. Among them were judges, practicing lawyers, and heads of law schools. In addition nearly a hundred Chicago lawyers attended the evening discussions.

"Christ and Law," "Love for Justice," and "Christian and Lawyer" were the subjects of three conference dialogues, discussional sub-conferences, and extensive "bull sessions." Paired for each dialogue were a theologian and a lawyer. The speakers were Professors Wilber Katz and Marcus Barth of the University of Chicago's Law and Theology faculties respectively; Professors Harold Berman and Paul Lehmann of Harvard Law and Divinity schools; and attorney John Mulder and North Park theologian Karl Olson, both of Chicago.

William Stringfellow, New York attorney and chairman of the conference, reported that half a dozen law schools represented at the conference had already extended invitations for consultations on Christianity and law, that area conferences may be held in California, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, that four books in the field have already been commissioned, that the conference had increased the likelihood of conversation and joint work between divinity and law schools, and that a few law firms were holding regular staff meetings on the subject.

Study Church Colleges

Dr. Pendleton Gaines, former president of Wofford College, has been authorized by the Fund for the Advancement of Education to analyze and assess the value of the church college in America. He plans to interview approximately 250 college leaders and send questionnaires to several hundred more. He will talk to lay and clerical leaders, trustees, faculty, and responsible citizens. From them he expects the first broad picture of how the church college views its own responsibilities and is meeting them, what are its problems of church control and of financial support, what

are its problems of educational program as a branch of the church, how they differ from other colleges, and other questions.

Council of Protestant Colleges

The first meeting of the newly-organized Council of Protestant Colleges and Universities will open Jan. 5, 1959, in Kansas City, Missouri. This council was brought into being at the recent Convocation of Christian Colleges and will supersede the CHE Dept. of Christian Colleges. Its office will be in Washington, D.C., in order to better serve the interests of its constituents.

Man's Place in Nature

In March 1955 New York University-Bellevue Medical Center pioneered in a new and important area of education by establishing a special library, the Library on Man's Place in Nature.

The reason for establishing this Library is that in consequence of the rapid advances of technical knowledge in medicine and related fields neither medical students nor instruction staff have adequate opportunity to keep informed on the humanistic and philosophical implications of modern science. The physician must remain more or less a layman except in his own segment of specialized knowledge, and information, factual and interpretative which is important for all mankind may remain hidden from him for years.

It is proposed to place in the Library on Man's Place in Nature selected current books and journals which deal with cosmogony, physics, biology, philosophy, semantics, comparative religion, social anthropology, etc., as well as books which have proved to be of historical significance—supplementing the present technical library of the Medical Center. Here the interested student will find volumes displayed in a single room, organized logically by subject matter and readily available for inspection and withdrawal which directly and indirectly deal with the question of values as re-interpreted from time to time in the light of man's ever-increasing knowledge of himself.

The Library on Man's Place in Nature thus represents an effort to disseminate modern knowledge more widely and quickly to the end

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of broadening the medical curriculum by including the humanistic implications of science and by putting this knowledge to more effective use for the general welfare of mankind. (Quoted from the Library's announcement.)

Teachers Wanted Overseas

Several countries of the Near, Middle, and Far East have requested International Voluntary Services to send some American teachers who can instruct in their local provincial colleges. The IVS is a non-profit non-denominational, but Christian, organization representing the Catholic and thirteen Protestant denominations in America. Most of their previous projects have been agricultural assistance in underdeveloped countries with young qualified American personnel and financed by Point Four and private foundations. Any teachers who can qualify for these overseas assignments under IVS will be able to take an active part in creating international goodwill and human understanding while sharing their technical abilities with the people of less advanced societies.

Episcopal Faculty

The Church Society for College Work and the Division of College Work of the National Council of the Episcopal Church announce two Summer Schools in Theology and Religion in 1959. These schools will provide Episcopal teachers and administrators with opportunity to enhance their knowledge and understanding of the Christian faith through lectures, seminars, and group discussions; to engage in individual study of some phase of Christian theology or of the relations between theology and their scholarly or administrative work; and to enjoy an experience of Christian community through worship and study in the company of colleagues from various institu-

tions and regions; so that they may better fulfil their responsibilities as lay ministers witnessing to the intellectual dimensions of the Christian faith within the colleges and universities. The emphasis will be on individual study and work. The faculty (see page 600) will be available as tutors, critics, and guides, and for regular conferences concerning the student's program of study. Room, Board, and additional financial assistance may be requested. Application blanks may be obtained from the Church Society for College Work, 3515 Woodley Road NW, Washington 16, D. C., and should be completed by February 1, 1959.

National Student Assembly

The Sixth National Student Assembly of the YMCA and YWCA will be held Dec. 28, 1958 - Jan. 3, 1959, at the University of Illinois. Delegates will discuss "World Community," "Men and Women in the Twentieth Century," "Our Concern for Interracial Relationships," "Work and Vocation."

Prayer for Students

The Universal Day of Prayer for Students will be observed on February 15, 1959 throughout the northern hemisphere. Since 1895 the World's Student Christian Federation has annually called upon Christians to pray for students in their life in the academic community. In the USA, the United Student Christian Council sponsors this observance on hundreds of campuses throughout the country as an occasion for the joint celebration by fellowships of students and by churches coming together — in praise and thanksgiving to God, and in petition and intercession for His Universal community of students.

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Dr. Elmen taught English Literature at Northwestern University for 10 years prior to joining the faculty of Seabury-Western Theological Seminary. **\$3.95**

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
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
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